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In the years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a substantial body of 
scholarship on the subject of terrorism has emerged without a unitary theory and course. 
What is today described as terrorism is scarcely a phenomenon unique to the 21st 
century. The roots of modern terrorism instead reside in the political history of the 19th 
and 20th centuries. This thesis asserts that modern terrorism begun in late imperial Russia 
and was perpetrated by early revolutionary groups including the nihilists, populists, and 
Socialist Revolutionaries. 
 This thesis explores the motivations that led young men and women in 19th and 
early 20th century Russia to resort to organized political violence against the regime of 
the era. The analysis breaks the roughly fifty year period into three phases based upon the 
group that was the primary agent of terror and focuses on three categories of influence 
that shaped the movements:  environmental conditions, ideological agitation, and 
individual motivations. The research revealed that in all three phases of terrorism, the 
three modes of influence help to illuminate why the groups resorted to violence. 
Moreover, the thesis suggests that the same paradigm can be a useful approach to 
analyzing other terrorist groups throughout history.    
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Many specialists in the field of terrorism trace the roots of modern terrorist 
movements to Russia in the late 19th century and early 20th century.1  In what has 
become a largely forgotten chapter of history for those fixated on the present as well as 
on a single part of the globe, a significant number of individuals, usually young, 
educated, and relatively well-to-do, partook in a variety of terrorist campaigns that lasted 
over five decades, claimed the lives of many citizens and officials, including one Tsar, 
and significantly changed the social and political landscape of the nation in which they 
lived.2  The groups and individuals involved in prerevolutionary terrorism sought to bring 
about societal change and they achieved their goal, although not always in the form they 
expected. In the present day, the world once again faces a significant terrorist threat, but 
the practitioners of the movement seem very different from their Russian forebears, at 
first glance. If the prerevolutionary outbreak of terrorism in Russia represents the 
foundation of the modern terrorist movement, then there should be a number of 
continuities in the characteristics and principles even if the environment, targets, and 
operators have changed. Understanding the underlying constants of ideas, personality, 
society, and state that helped to produce prerevolutionary Russian terrorism will deepen 
the understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism, as a whole. Thus, in addition to the 
historical account contained herein, this thesis suggests an analytical framework to assess 
the motivations that drive individuals into terror cells and apply it, as best as possible, to 
the Russian terrorist movements that took place between 1866 and 1908. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 demonstrated that certain groups still 
believe that terrorism is a viable strategy and that certain individuals continue to be 
                                                 
1 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 5. 
2 Philip Pomper, “Russian Revolutionary Terrorism,” in Terrorism in Context, ed. Martha Crenshaw 
(University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 63–65. 
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willing to carry out terrorist acts. Moreover, with the assistance of modern technology, 
terrorist actions have the potential to be more destructive than any time in previous 
history. In addition to the governmental responses that seek to address terrorism, the 
academic community has also become heavily involved in seeking to understand the 
phenomenon of terrorism and learning how to counter it at home and abroad. In order to 
fully understand a modern movement or event, historical context and background are 
critical. Thus, to reach a greater understanding of modern terrorism, it is vital to 
understand the ideas, state, and society from which it grew. In comparison to the broader 
literature on terrorism, which has grown to be quite substantial, the amount of literature 
describing terrorism’s Russian roots is relatively meager. This thesis will endeavor to 
contribute to the existing scholarship about terrorism, writ large, by adding to the 
understanding of the prerevolutionary Russian terror that served as the modern variant’s 
progenitor. 
Additionally, Russian terrorism in the late 19th and early 20th century is an 
interesting historical case study of social movements within nations and the 
psychological factors that can allow seemingly normal people to do terrible things. For 
many analysts of either Russia or terrorism, Russia’s inaugural experience with terror is 
overshadowed by the far more destructive revolution that began in 1917 and even more 
so by the unthinkable scale of state terror perpetrated by Joseph Stalin. The casualties 
from the entirety of the prerevolutionary terrorist movement pale in comparison to the 
body count of Stalin’s purges that took place over the course of just a few years. As a 
result, Russia’s prerevolutionary outbreak of terrorism has become an almost forgotten 
chapter of history. Even though the outbreak of revolutionary terrorism was not the most 
destructive event that occurred in the same area in the general time period, its effects are 
still significant. In addition to sowing the seeds of modern day terrorism, the groups and 
individuals that were involved in the prerevolutionary terrorist movement informed and 




revolutionary movements and the country, as a whole.3  Thus, terrorism represents a 
major factor in the broader Russian revolution, which was a very significant historical 
event not just in Russia but worldwide. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
As implied by the major research question, the functional aspects of the thesis will 
involve the root causes of the prerevolutionary terrorist movements in Russia. Based 
upon the surveyed literature, three of the most significant factors that characterized the 
birth of Russian terrorism in the targeted period were the prevailing characteristics of the 
social and governmental environment, the psychological underpinnings of membership in 
a terrorist cell, and the efforts of ideologues in masterminding terrorist operations and 
building revolutionary principles. The initial hypothesis of the thesis is that 
environmental factors facilitated the emergence of terrorism, psychological factors 
motivated accession to terror cells, and ideologues conducted the daily operations of 
terrorist groups. Moreover, the thesis will hypothesize that the three factors are mutually 
reinforcing and that without any one of the particular factors it is much less likely for 
terrorism to occur. 
It bears noting that, in terms of identity and scope, terrorism of the present day is 
significantly different from Russian terrorism around the turn of the 20th century. While 
terrorism in Russia was atheist and domestic, terrorism of the present day is religious and 
international. Although modern terrorism seems very different in practice, the thesis 
hypothesizes that the underlying principles that lead to the rise of terrorism have 
remained largely the same over the years. Namely, that the social and political 
environment still facilitates the rise of extremist thought, individuals still have 
psychological motivations to join radical movements, and ideologues still recruit and 
manage terrorist assets and drive terrorist operations. 
                                                 
3 Pomper, “Russian Revolutionary Terrorism,” 66. 
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The development of Russian terrorism is a complex and multifaceted subject and 
a significant number of sources are required to deliver even a rudimentary knowledge of 
the subject. Fortunately, although the Soviet regime is renowned for curtailing or 
censoring most efforts at conducting objective historical research, the Communist party 
permitted and even encouraged the study of the early revolutionary movements in the 
post-Stalinist period.4  Those early revolutionary movements not only prepared the soil 
for the Communist revolution in 1917, but they were also closely tied to a pronounced 
outbreak of terrorism that was perpetrated by a variety of groups and individuals over the 
course of more than 50 years. As with most historical phenomena, a diverse set of 
opinions prevail on the world’s first experience with modern terrorism and the sources 
diverge and intersect in informative ways. At the simplest level, the existing literature on 
the subject can be divided based upon the sources’ selected timeframe. In Philip 
Pomper’s chapter on Russian revolutionary terrorism in Terrorism in Context, he divides 
the prerevolutionary period into three sub-periods based upon the characteristics of the 
terrorists or terrorist groups of the times: nihilist, populist, and Socialist Revolutionary 
(SR).5  A more informative yet nuanced division can be drawn among the surveyed 
authors in terms of the primary factor cited with bringing about terrorism. Although there 
is overlap in some places, the authors explain the occurrence of terrorism primarily in 
terms of environmental, ideological, or individual factors. It would be impractical to 
delineate every possible way in which the authors concur or differ on the topic of Russian 
revolutionary terrorism, but there are a number of other significant distinctions between 
sources, as well. The most meaningful of the other differentiating factors are the topics of 
objective explanation versus more subjective approaches and primary sources versus 
secondary ones. Overall, the diversity and expanse of available literature provide an  
 
 
                                                 
4 Anna Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), 3. 
5 Pomper, “Russian Revolutionary Terrorism,” 68, 75, 89. 
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excellent foundation upon which to pursue an understanding of the development of 
Russian revolutionary terrorism and how it provides valuable insights into terrorism in 
the present day. 
One of the major delineating factors in analyzing prerevolutionary Russian 
terrorism is the timeframe in which it took place. There is some disagreement on when 
exactly the terrorist movements in Russia begun, but most accounts place the start in 
student movements that began around 1950. Some analysts like Franco Venturi place the 
beginnings a little earlier, in 1848, and some others like Philip Pomper are more general 
and state only that the beginnings were in the 1850s.6  Although Pomper provides a more 
general perspective on the beginning of the Russian terrorist movement, he offers more 
precise start and end dates for the main phases of the movements which serve as useful 
demarcations for analysis. The nihilist cycle, the first phase of the pre-revolutionary 
terrorist movement, began during the ideologically charged period between 1861 and 
1863 when several extremist tomes by Peter Zaichnevskii (Young Russia) and Nicholas 
Chernyshevskii (What Is to Be Done?) were published and gained a significant following, 
especially among students. The period lasted until roughly 1871 when the trial of a 
contingent of followers of Sergei Nechaev, a particularly bloodthirsty and influential 
terrorist, delegitimized the nihilist movement to much of society.7   The next phase of 
terror was primarily characterized by populists like the members of the groups Land and 
Freedom and Narodnaya Volia (People’s Will). The populist period began in 1876 with 
the founding of the populist faction known as Land and Freedom and ended in 1894 as 
the Social Democratic movement overtook Narodnaya Volia in popularity.8  The most 
critical years in the populist phase, however, were from 1878 through 1882 during which 
populist terrorist activity was the most pronounced.9  The final phase of prerevolutionary 
terror was the SR era, which began in 1901 when the SR party began to adopt terrorist 
                                                 
6 Franco Venturi, Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in 
Nineteenth Century Russia, trans. Francis Haskell (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), xxxii; Pomper, 
“Russian Revolutionary Terrorism,” 63. 
7 Pomper, “Russian Revolutionary Terrorism,” 68–69, 72–73. 
8 Ibid., 75, 82, 88. 
9 Ibid., 79. 
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methods. The SR party endured until it was eliminated by the Bolsheviks in the post-
revolutionary civil war, but its practice of terrorism largely ended in 1908 with the Azef 
affair.10  With few minor exceptions, all of the other surveyed works on Russian 
terrorism fall within those periods. Some of the surveyed authors like Anna Geifman in 
Death Orders:  The Vanguard of Modern Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia and Adam 
Ulam in In the Name of the People:  Prophets and Conspirators in Prerevolutionary 
Russia deal with all three periods, and others like Norman Naimark in Terrorists and 
Social Democrats and Anna Geifman in Entangled in Terror:  The Azef Affair and the 
Russian Revolution deal with a single period.11  Still others address two successive 
periods of the three. There are gaps of a few years between the periods and some 
significant events such as the assassination of Alexander II in 1881 are not reflected in 
the date-based classification system of this thesis, but overall time period is a useful way 
to categorize terrorist activity in the prerevolutionary period.12 
Time-based distinctions are useful in building a basic understanding of 
prerevolutionary Russian terrorism, but categorization based upon factors used to explain 
the birth of terrorist tactics in Russia is conducive to a much deeper, more nuanced 
understanding of the phenomenon. Of the surveyed authors, most analyses of the 
underlying causes of terrorism can be placed into one of three categories: environmental, 
ideological, and psychological. The preceding categories are not drawn from any 
particular work, but were synthesized from the broader works cited. Proponents of 
environmental explanations for the rise of terrorism in prerevolutionary Russia cite the 
pervasive oppression and broader social stagnation of the period as primary explanatory 
factors. Authors in the environmental mode assert that the prevailing conditions created 
fertile soil for extremism to grow and condemn the late tsarist regime for allowing such a 
                                                 
10 Pomper, “Russian Revolutionary Terrorism,” 89, 98. 
11 Anna Geifman, Death Orders: The Vanguard of Modern Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia (Santa 
Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2010); Adam B. Ulam, In the Name of the People: Prophets and 
Conspirators in Prerevolutionary Russia (New York: The Viking Press, 1977); Norman M. Naimark, 
Terrorists and Social Democrats: The Russian Revolutionary Movement Under Alexander III (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1983); Anna Geifman, Entangled in Terror: The Azef Affair and the Russian 
Revolution (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 2000). 
12 Naimark, Terrorists and Social Democrats, 1.      
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desperate situation.13 Significant proponents of this scheme are Naimark in Terrorists 
and Social Democrats and Vera Broido in Apostles into Terrorists:  Women and the 
Revolutionary Movement in the Russia of Alexander II.14  To a lesser extent, Clark 
McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko also use environmental explanations in their analysis 
contained in Friction:  How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us, but they also draw 
heavily from the psychological category.15  The next major category is characterized by 
what this thesis refers to as the ideological explanation of the rise of terrorism. The 
ideological explanation of terrorism focuses on specific groups or individuals that 
developed extremist ideologies and sought to spread their ideas. In Russia’s case, 
individuals like Nechaev, Herzen, and Chernyshevskii and groups like Land and Freedom 
and Narodnaya Volia served as ideologues which refined and spread ideals of 
extremism.16  Some of the major authors that espouse the ideological explanatory scheme 
are Franco Venturi in Roots of Revolution:  A History of the Populist and Socialist 
Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia and Ulam in In the Name of the People.17  
Anna Geifman also employs an ideologue-driven perspective to a degree in Entangled in 
Terror.18  The final explanatory category is based upon the psychological principles that 
can lead a person to become radicalized. The psychological approach is the most recent 
of the three categories to emerge in literature and it is broadly evident in all three of Anna 
Geifman’s books that were surveyed for the thesis (Death Orders, Entangled in Terror, 
and Thou Shalt Kill:  Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917) as well as in 
Friction by McCauley and Moskalenko.19 The psychological category is particularly 
important to this thesis because it is the most readily applicable to the appearance of 
terrorism in the modern context. Friction is particularly path-breaking because it 
                                                 
13 Vera Broido, Apostles into Terrorists: Women and the Revolutionary Movement in the Russia of 
Alexander II (New York: The Viking Press, 1977), 17. 
14 Naimark, Terrorists and Social Democrats; Broido, Apostles into Terrorists.  
15 McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction. 
16 Venturi, Roots of Revolution, Table of Contents. 
17 Venturi, Roots of Revolution; Ulam, In the Name of the People. 
18 Geifman, Entangled in Terror. 
19 Geifman, Entangled in Terror; Geifman, Death Orders; Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill;  McCauley and 
Moskalenko, Friction. 
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endeavors to describe terrorism as a phenomenon that belongs not only to the mentally 
aberrant, but is equally likely to occur among individuals of sound and rational mind 
given the proper motivations.20  McCauley and Moskalenko’s analysis is also valuable in 
the context of the prerevolutionary period because it allows a deeper understanding of the 
terrorists of the time who could not all have been sociopathic or mentally infirm. No 
single explanatory categorization is conclusive in and of itself, but the combination of the 
three significantly deepens the academic discourse on the topic of Russian revolutionary 
terrorism. 
Classifications based upon time and content are the primary means by which the 
thesis will analyze the available research, but there are also a number of other distinctions 
among the sources that bear note. A major characteristic that distinguishes several of the 
authors is the level of emotional attachment to the subject. To some, terrorism is a highly 
emotional issue; the number of people who have lost an acquaintance or loved one to 
terrorism or knows someone in the process of fighting against terrorism is on the rise 
within the United States and abroad. A number of the surveyed authors are implicitly or 
explicitly more emotionally invested in the subject than others. In the introduction to 
Death Orders, Geifman openly admits that the topic of terrorism is an emotional one for 
her; she knows victims of terror and has felt its impacts in her own life.21  Vera Broido’s 
Apostles into Terrorists has an implicit emotional bias because she was personally 
associated with some of the revolutionary figures about whom she wrote.22  Other 
analysts, including Franco Venturi in Roots of Revolution, are acclaimed for providing 
balanced, objective perspectives on the topic.23  In the case of Friction, one of the key 
reasons that the authors chose Russian revolutionary terrorism as a case study was 
because, due to its distance in time and space, it was less likely to elicit an emotional 
reaction than more contemporary movements.24  This thesis will endeavor to be as 
                                                 
20 McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction, 4. 
21 Geifman, Death Orders, 6. 
22 Broido, Apostles into Terrorists, v. 
23 Venturi, Roots of Revolution, vii. 
24 McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction, 6. 
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objective as possible, but will proceed with the understanding that sources written by less 
objective authors still contain a great deal of valuable information and that it is extremely 
challenging to cleanse any analysis of the traces of the authors emotions. 
Another significant distinction between sources is whether or not they are primary 
sources. Of the resources surveyed, one is primary. Vera Broido’s Apostles into 
Terrorists is a description of women during the nihilist and populist phases of Russian 
terrorism, much of which is drawn from her personal correspondences with her 
subjects.25  Primary sources demand that a certain level of respect and care be taken in 
incorporating them into a thesis. Due to her personal contacts with her subjects, Broido 
has a more accepting perspective on the Russian terrorists than many other authors, and 
there are places in the book where her personal biases appear with great clarity. Broido’s 
account, however, is robust because she wrote it later in her life after the movement ran 
its course and after having read a great deal of supplementary literature.26 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will take the form of an extended case study of the terrorist 
movements that took place in Russia from roughly 1861 to 1908. From that case study, 
the thesis will attempt to isolate a number of factors that were instrumental in producing 
the terrorist movements of the period with particular attention paid to the psychological, 
environmental, and ideological dimensions. To the greatest extent possible, the analysis 
will focus on terrorism as a historical, social, and political phenomenon. Concrete 
examples of Russian terrorists, terrorist groups, and terrorist acts will be used to deepen 
the context and promote a greater understanding of Russia’s prerevolutionary situation. 
The intended outcome of the case study is a set of broader conditions that contributed to 
producing terrorism in Russia in the prerevolutionary period and a nuanced explanation 
of why they are important. The thesis will also assess the validity and effectiveness of the 
selected analytical system which evaluates the Russian revolutionary terrorist phases in 
terms of environmental, ideological, and individual factors. The most important sources 
                                                 
25 Broido, Apostles into Terrorists, vi–vii. 
26 Ibid., vii. 
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for this thesis will be written historical accounts and analyses of terrorist movements as 
well as historical analyses of the period from whence the terrorist movements arose. The 
terrorist movements in Russia are intimately tied to the historical conditions in which 
they occurred, so a history-based analysis is critical. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis will be organized into three main parts, each one based on a specific 
phase of revolutionary terrorism between the years of 1866 and 1908. The chapters will 
be arranged in chronological order beginning with the nihilist movement, continuing on 
to the populist movement, and then finishing with the SR movement. Dividing the 
broader period will not only focus analysis into more manageable lengths of time, but 
also will allow a greater degree of specificity in addressing the movements which 
differed from one another in meaningful ways. In each of the time periods, the thesis will 
offer a detailed description of the terrorist movement that characterized the period and 
then endeavor to distill the factors, persons, or societal conditions that best describe the 
movement’s creation and purpose. The purpose of the historical analysis is to provide a 
broad description of the phenomenon of terrorism in prerevolutionary Russia and 
delineate some of the phenomenon’s foundational and enduring features. The thesis will 
conclude with a synthesis and presentation of the findings. 
  
 11 
II. PHASE ONE:  THE NIHILISTS 
Russia’s first experience with modern terrorism came in the form of the nihilist 
movement that begun in 1866 and lasted until 1871. The core of the nihilist ideology was 
characterized by a total rejection of the estate-based order of society, especially as 
exemplified by the Tsar and his state structure.27  The opening salvo to what would 
become a prolonged war between the Russian state and terrorism took place on April 4, 
1866 when Dimitrii Karakozov, a radicalized college student, attempted to assassinate 
Tsar Alexander II. Even though Karakozov’s bullet missed its target, it still did a great 
deal of damage. Karakozov’s actions not only emboldened his radical comrades but also 
spawned a massive government crackdown often known as the “White Terror.”28 As 
often occurs with reactionary state policing programs, the “White Terror” did lead to the 
apprehension of many members of nihilist circles, but the heavy-handed manner in which 
it was enforced served only to further alienate and radicalize the broader movement.29  
The movement retained magnetism for several years, but the extreme means and 
perspectives espoused by the nihilists eventually exceeded those which the broader 
society was willing to accept and even outpaced some of their ideological forebears. In 
connection with the 1871 trial of a particularly extreme circle of nihilists led by Sergei 
Nechaev, the movement lost its influence and mystique.30  The movement was short-
lived and did not perpetrate violence on a great scale. It did, however, claim the life of 
one of its own members.31  Of course, the nihilist movement did not simply spring into 
existence by chance nor was violence the inevitable outcome of the movement. The rise 
of nihilists as a terrorist group was motivated in large part by the state, society, and 
culture of the era from whence it arose; the ideological and tactical foundation laid by the 
                                                 
27 McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction, 97. 
28 Venturi, Roots of Revolution, 347; Pomper, “Russian Revolutionary Terrorism,” 69. 
29 Pomper, 71. 
30 Pomper, 72–73, 75; Venturi, 381. 
31 Ulam, In the Name of the People, 192–193. 
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movement’s motivators and members; and the macabre allure that the groups were able 
to generate. Details on the Russian political system will be addressed in the next section. 
A. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
The resort to terrorism among groups that sought change comes as no great 
surprise granted the political situation of the mid-19th century. The promulgation of laws 
was driven primarily by the whims of the sovereign which often led to governmental 
policies that appeared arbitrary and inefficient. Although the ideological environment 
was oppressive, the barrier against more liberal Western ideas was not airtight. As a 
result, a persistent group of revolutionary thinkers developed beginning roughly in the 
mid-19th century drawing, in part, their inspiration from revolutionary and liberalizing 
efforts as had unfolded elsewhere in Europe since the late 18th century. Initially, the 
battle for liberalization was one of words, but impassioned pleas, satire, and even 
entreaties to logic failed to generate the desired actions from the capitol. Thus, once 
activists came to believe that peaceful means failed to advance their causes, it was only a 
matter of time until spilled ink gave way to spilled blood. Several issues, in particular, 
drew fire from individuals who sought reform including the institution of serfdom, 
stratification of privilege, widespread prosecution for ideological crimes, and educational 
restrictions.32 
One of the most significant targets of liberal thinkers was the institution of 
serfdom. Serfdom was a long-standing Russian institution in which an agrarian caste 
comprised of people known as peasants or serfs were hereditarily tied to the land upon 
which they worked. Often little different from slaves, peasants lived and worked under 
the leadership of a land owner who could direct, discipline, or even sell them as he or she 
desired. Additionally, there were legal penalties and restrictions on runaways. It was 
possible, however, for peasants to purchase their own freedom and they were allowed to 
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have property, a house, and a family.33  By and large, peasants were surprisingly 
compliant; from the imposition of serfdom to its abolition there were only a few instances 
of large-scale peasant rebellion. The historical record notwithstanding, the Tsarist regime 
worried profoundly about peasant uprisings, and the outcome of that concern was the 
development of Russia’s internal security structure and mentality.34  In order to keep 
serfs in place and relatively passive, the regime adopted a system of internal passports 
and personal movement controls and restricted education, long seen by the regime as a 
liberalizing influence.  
Another major front on the battle against serfdom occurred among the members 
of educated society. Informed by ideals of the enlightenment and the fact that very few 
European nations retained the system or any corollary to it, writers of all disciplines 
launched an array of literary broadsides at the practice and the regime that allowed it to 
stand.35 Additionally, by the end of the 1850s Russia had also received a resounding 
lesson on its broader cultural backwardness in the form of the Crimean War in which the 
British and French fought against the Russians over control of the Black Sea and the 
Straits. The once-vaunted Russian army performed so dismally that the War is 
characterized by some as “almost semicomical.”36  Such an embarrassing performance 
was a stinging indictment against the credibility of the regime. Thus, when Alexander II 
took the throne in 1855, the national atmosphere was strongly calling for change, and to 
some degree the new Tsar was willing to accommodate.37  Due to a combination of the 
boisterous public outcry and the Tsar’s desire to reform the obviously antiquated system, 
Alexander II abolished serfdom in 1861.38  Even though the peasants were formally 
emancipated, however, their situation improved only nominally. In fact, the material 
wellbeing of many peasants actually decreased. In many cases, former serfs divided the 
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property of the landowners among themselves only to find that the resulting plots of land 
were insufficient even for subsistence.39  Although they had ample reason for discontent, 
former serfs were generally not participants in nihilist terrorist groups nor in most other 
forms of political or revolutionary activity, for that matter. A group known as the 
Narodniki even attempted to release the alleged revolutionary potential of the agricultural 
class through their “to the people” campaign. Ironically, the movement ended in failure 
because the newly freed peasants distrusted the revolutionaries and still viewed the Tsar 
as their great king and benefactor.40  The mistreated agricultural class did become, 
however, the rallying call for the disaffected university students that comprised the 
majority of the nihilist movement. In evidence, Karakozov initially told investigating 
authorities that he was a peasant after he was taken into royal custody.41  Surely, some 
nihilists did actually feel some sympathy for the plight of the common man, but abuse of 
the peasants served primarily as a contrived grievance to unify would-be nihilists who 
were usually individuals of relative status and means.  
Even in the present day, a visitor to either Moscow or St. Petersburg cannot help 
but be stunned by the grandeur of imperial palaces and seats of government. The Amber 
Room of Catherine’s Palace, the fountains at Peterhof, and the Kremlin were extravagant 
by the standards of the European dynasties of the era. Access to such fabulous locales, 
however, was possible only to a select portion of the broader Russian population. Adam 
Ulam encapsulates the situation of the commoner when he states that “the most loyal and 
patriotic subject could not help noticing that once you crossed the border from Europe 
into Russia the atmosphere became heavier, common people more servile and 
bedraggled,…all the amenities of life shabbier.”42  Privilege and wealth were highly 
stratified and located primarily in large cities. Unsurprisingly, much of the wealth was 
also concentrated in the hands of those connected to the monarchy. Even the 
intelligentsia, which was a substantial and growing social class at the time, was 
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politically marginalized and of comparatively modest physical wealth. Significantly, 
many of the individuals who would become terrorists were students. By virtue of the 
location of Russia’s schools, students necessarily lived in larger cities like St. Petersburg 
and Moscow, which were also the locations in which the riches of the monarchy and its 
vestiges were presented most visibly. As a result, the students had a high degree of 
exposure to the excesses of the regime. Although base, the role of simple jealousy caused 
by the gap between the haves and have-nots cannot be ignored as a significant 
environmental influence on the expression of radical thought and action.  
The unsteadily liberalizing environment of the 1850s and 1860s also played a 
major part in turning dissidents into radicals. On one hand, the regime actively opposed 
dissent in public forums and media, but on the other, the period also saw a substantial 
opening of universities to broader swaths of society and, at first, rather lax behavioral and 
ideological constraints on students. Until roughly the death of Nicholas I, education was 
largely a right of the highly privileged and heavily preferential towards individuals who 
were destined for service in government. Rules were strict and specialties like history and 
philosophy were significantly limited. Simply put, Russian universities were not places 
that encouraged independent thought or that turned out many intellectuals, in the 
traditional sense. In the early phases of Alexander II’s reign, universities changed 
substantially; they abolished uniforms, ended military training, gave students a relatively 
free hand in self-administration, adopted a strikingly permissive stance on the content of 
student publications, and most importantly opened enrollment to the general 
population.43  The predictable result of the changes to the educational system was a 
sweeping and profound exposure of the students to radical publications and ideologues. 
Students enjoyed relatively free access to writings by a number of influential 
revolutionaries including Herzen, Dobrolyubov, Chernyshevsky, and others.44  Certainly, 
some students appreciated the deeper philosophical and political nuances of the 
revolutionary ideologues, but in most cases, students merely used revolutionary ideas as a 
                                                 
43 Venturi, Roots of Revolution, 220–222. 
44 Ibid., 223. 
 16 
means to justify unruliness.45 During the late 1850s and into the 1860s, there was a rash 
of blatant student misconduct in several major Russian cities. In some cases, the 
transgression was merely drunkenness, but as time passed, the breaches became more 
significant and political. Students were even able to force a number of unpopular 
professors to resign.46  In an attempt to regain control, school administrations, often with 
the complicity of the provincial police and government, begun to reduce the carte 
blanche that had been granted to the students. Naturally, the crackdown spawned even 
greater protests. In 1861, students organized the first ever demonstration in St. Petersburg 
which resulted in a number of students being arrested and imprisoned.47  The students 
were eventually released on relatively light sentences, but by that time the damage was 
already done.48  For the regime, the whole situation was a complete loss. Not only had 
government policy facilitated the occurrence of the outbreak, but the manner in which it 
tried to restore order was poorly executed. The end result was that the government not 
only gave further evidence of its own ineffectiveness but also deepened the grievances 
between itself and the student population.   
The whole episode also revealed another major inconsistency in the regime’s 
ideological policy because, while universities were ostensibly liberalizing, dissent was 
still largely illegal among the population, at large. At the time, many revolutionary 
ideologues lived and worked outside of Russia or published in secret, sometimes even 
from prison. Although punishments for ideological offenses were generally less severe 
than they were in previous eras or would become in later ones, one could still expect 
prison or exile if convicted of an ideological offense. The circumstances are rare in which 
a government can enforce ideological controls in anything but a heavy-handed manner. 
Additionally, it was easy for early revolutionaries and dissidents to use rough and 
allegedly unfair treatment by the government to build credibility among their followers;  
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they endured hardship for the cause. Ultimately, ideological repression is an ineffective 
policy for any government, but Russia’s sloppy and inconsistent execution of it only 
made matters worse. 
By the time of Nicholas I’s death, the soil was well prepared for the roots of 
nihilist extremism to take hold. Even though Alexander II’s first years were characterized 
by the generally aptly called “great reforms” it was too late to uproot the weed of 
extremism and terrorism.49  The institution of serfdom, the extreme concentration of 
wealth in royal hands, the ideological restraints on the public, and the repressive policies 
did much to arm the enemies of the regime. The combination of governmental 
ineffectiveness and public grievance thus provided dangerous fertilizer for a terrorist 
movement. 
B. MAJOR IDEOLOGUES 
While environmental conditions were a significant contributor to the outbreak of 
nihilist terrorism in the 1860s in Russia, the national condition was only one of several 
contributing influences. During the 1860s and the years preceding it a number of 
individuals served to both inform and impassion the would-be terrorists to rise against the 
regime. Most of these ideologues were writers or journalists, and included individuals 
such as Pyotr Zaichnevsky, Nicholas Chernyshevskii, and Mikhail Bakunin. 
Additionally, terror cell leaders like Sergei Nechaev served not only in managerial 
functions, but also developed ideological guidance for members. The actions and 
influence of nihilist ideologues contributed significantly to not only the occurrence of 
terrorism, but also the conduct of terrorists once the groups developed. 
1. The Golden Age of Russian Literature 
According to W. Bruce Lincoln in Between Heaven and Hell: The Story of a 
Thousand Years of Artistic Life in Russia, “[d]uring the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the ability to portray life as it really was, not as it might—or ought to—be made 
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Russia’s painters, writers, and composers the equal of any in Europe.”50  In the time that 
stretched from roughly 1850 to 1880, the inward gaze of Russian writers produced some 
of Russia’s finest literary works including Turgenev’s A Hunters Sketches, Fathers and 
Sons; Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment, The Devils, Notes from the House of the 
Dead, and The Idiot; and Tolstoi’s War and Peace, Anna Karenina, and Eugene 
Onegin.51  Anyone versed in Russian literature of this period is sure to note that 
happiness, levity, and contentment are exceedingly rare. Thus, it is no great surprise that 
the outbreak of nihilist terrorism occurred within the same period. In fact, Turgenev was 
a significant, although somewhat unintentional contributor to the nihilist ideology. In his 
book Fathers and Sons, the main protagonist, Eugene Bazarov, is a prototypical nihilist. 
Bazarov rejects the conventions and vestiges of the time en masse and puts the entirety of 
his hope and faith in natural science. It is no small irony that Bazarov’s death is a direct 
result of his scientific pursuits.52  Even the one thing in which Bazarov places his faith is 
ultimately empty. It bears noting that the term “nihilism” is based upon the Latin nihil or 
nothing which Turgenev’s depiction clearly bears out.53  Fathers and Sons, however, 
offered no concrete solution or potential courses of action, which was largely borne out 
by nihilist terrorists who had no broader purpose, save to destroy the system as it 
currently existed.54  It must be stated, however, that Turgenev was hardly a nihilist; many 
even criticized Turgenev for failing to follow his narrative with actions or even 
feelings.55 
2. Nicholas Chernyshevsky 
By a modern appraisal, Nicholas Chernyshevsky was an unlikely figure to 
become a revolutionary leader. Chernyshevsky was verbose in writing and awkward in 
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personality, yet his life and his work did much to clarify and popularize the idea of the 
“new man” to which many nihilists deeply ascribed.56  Although much of 
Chernyshevsky’s adult life reflected his cause, his most significant contributions to the 
nihilist ideology were his written works, especially his book entitled What is to Be 
Done?, and his public humiliation at the hands of the regime. Of Chernyshevsky’s impact 
on the prerevolutionary movement, Adam Ulam states that Chernyshevsky “was not the 
maker of the new world, but he took what was perhaps a passing fad and made it a 
religion at whose altar generations of Russian revolutionaries would worship.”57  A 
critical component of the Chernyshevsky’s new world was the concept of the new man. 
The new man was conceptually a young person who abandoned the structures and 
institutions of the broader society and conformed to a new perspective on humanity and 
human relations. It goes almost without saying that a new man was opposed to the ancien 
regime of the Tsars, but a more significant and notable feature of the new man is revealed 
by the associated principles of the new woman and new marriage.58  Predictably, the 
precipitant of the new world was a profound sexual revolution among all varieties of 
political extremists to include both the nihilists and the populists. New women were to be 
held in all respects equal to men and new marriages were, in all cases, sexually open for 
both members.59  Proponents of the new world launched their assault against the 
traditional family because they viewed it as foundational element of society and, relative 
to the regime, it was an easier and more immediate target.60  Additionally, since new 
marriages were by definition not recognized by either the state or the church, they had the 
convenient effect of pushing would-be revolutionaries further out of the mainstream of 
society.61  According to Vera Broido, Chernyshevsky’s portrayal of the relationship 
between members of a new marriage as revealed in What is to Be Done? borders on 
caricature. The titular man and wife do not cohabitate and even knock before entering 
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one another’s rooms.62  Although the relationship in the story is somewhat extreme, it 
was nonetheless emulated in several cases, to include in Chernyshevsky’s own 
marriage.63     
In addition to publishing What is to Be Done?, Chernyshevsky regularly 
contributed to other revolutionary publications to include The Contemporary. Moreover, 
Chernyshevsky was able to coalesce a substantial following, especially among university 
students.64 Unsurprisingly, the combination of his inflammatory journalism and large 
personal following made Chernyshevsky a decidedly unpopular man among government 
circles. In 1862, following a series of fires in St. Petersburg that were dubiously linked to 
nihilists, government agents arrested Chernyshevsky and his associate Nicholas Serno-
Solovievich.65  Relying largely on fabricated or questionably obtained evidence, 
prosecuting authorities were able to convict Chernyshevsky of a variety of ideological 
offenses for which his final sentence was six years hard labor followed by a lifetime of 
exile in Siberia.66  In 1864, before Chernyshevsky left St. Petersburg, he was subjected to 
a “civic execution” intended to publicly humiliate him.67  While the event was intended 
to bring shame, the civic execution ultimately made Chernyshevsky a martyr with whom 
young nihilists could associate and elevate as a source of solidarity.68  Thus, Nicholas 
Chernyshevsky served to coalesce the nihilist movement both through his literature and 
through the example set by his own life, especially his public martyrdom. 
3. Pyotr Zaichnevsky 
Many early contributors to the nihilist movement concerned themselves primarily 
with spreading discontent and opposition to the regime but did not explicitly endorse 
violence. Pyotr Zaichnevsky, on the other hand, was quite a different breed. Called 
                                                 
62 Broido, Apostles into Terrorists, 25. 
63 Ibid., 26. 
64 Ulam, In the Name of the People, 59. 
65 Ibid., 111–112. 
66 Ibid., 113. 
67 Ibid., 114. 
68 Ibid., 144. 
 21 
Russia’s first real Jacobin, Zaichnevksy was a true revolutionary and extremist who 
added terrorism to the nihilist repertoire.69  Born in 1842 to landowning parents, 
Zaichnevsky was an avid reader and writer and was already well-versed in socialist 
literature by the time he entered the University of Moscow. During his college years he 
reprinted and sold a variety of socialist literature including several that he authored. 
Eventually, his activities drew official attention leading to his arrest and imprisonment.70  
In 1862, although incarcerated and only nineteen years of age, Zaichnevsky released one 
of his most well-known pamphlets entitled Young Russia.71  Some of the demands 
contained in Young Russia were relatively unsurprising and included calls for a pluralist 
representative body and socialist governance. Much of the tract, however, was radical 
and bloodthirsty. Zaichnevsky called for a destruction of all the standing political and 
social institutions and, more viciously, the liquidation of the entire royal family and any 
who sought to protect them.72  Young Russia was a substantial influence for 
conspiratorial nihilist groups, and after his eventual release from prison Zaichnevsky 
continued to move about Russia and cultivate extremist cells for much of the remainder 
of his life.73  Zaichnevsky later developed connections to populists and continued to 
advance his violent agenda.74  Although many individuals were able to produce literature 
that informed the perspectives of the nihilists, few called them to action the way that 
Zaichnevsky did. 
4. Mikhail Bakunin 
Perhaps the best characterization of Mikhail Bakunin is that he was a professional 
revolutionary, an opportunist, and a fanatic. Although politically an anarchist, Bakunin 
did a substantial amount to further the cause of the nihilists including providing 
ideological support to members of nihilist groups and co-authoring “Catechism of a 
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Revolutionary” with Sergei Nechaev. Bakunin was born to a noble family in 1814 and, 
save for his highly active nature, did not seem a likely candidate for his own future. He 
passed his early years largely in a manner perfunctory for someone of his social status, 
but began to drift from the comfortable statist mentality as an officer cadet.75  In the 
1830s, he discovered a passion for German political thought which he pursued to Berlin 
from whence he became a traveling revolutionary around Europe. By 1851 he found 
himself incarcerated in St. Petersburg where he languished until 1857 when he was 
granted exile in Siberia from where he was able to escape in 1861. By means of Japan, 
then the United States, Bakunin was able to reach London where he became associated 
with notable Russian revolutionaries like Herzen and Ogarev.76  Eventually, Bakunin 
worked his way to Switzerland, which became a well-known hotbed of Russian 
revolutionary activity in the 1860s and 1870s.77  Bakunin quickly became a popular 
figure among young revolutionaries due to his dynamism and unique history and travel.78  
One of Bakunin’s most consequential views was that the populace was but a small push 
away from revolution. In Bakunin’s mind, “natural rebels,” once brought together by 
influences like himself, would be the instrument by which the old order could be 
destroyed and the way cleared for a new one.79  For nihilists, Bakunin was even more 
significant because he conspired with Sergei Nechaev to, through some degree of 
negligence and ignorance, help build Nechaev’s terrorist enterprise. Bakunin and 
Nechaev shared personal interaction for only a few months in Switzerland in the summer 
of 1869, but it was a productive time.80  Bakunin took an immediate liking to Nechaev 
due to their shared penchant for action. Bakunin liked Nechaev so much, in fact, that he 
arranged to give Nechaev half of a revolutionary fund owned jointly by himself, Ogarev, 
and Herzen.81  Nechaev arrived in Switzerland with an entirely fabricated story that he 
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had escaped from the estimable Petropavlovsk prison, which Bakunin and Ogarev 
enthusiastically believed. The senior revolutionaries helped Nechaev print and distribute 
his fantastical story as well as a number of other publications which included the 
Catechism of a Revolutionary and The People’s Justice which, in addition to laying out 
guidelines for conducting conspiratorial actions, comprised Nechaev’s societal and 
governmental hit-list.82  Bakunin’s assistance in both fiscal and literary resources played 
a significant role in facilitating Nechaev’s murderous agenda. 
5. Sergei Nechaev 
If there is one person who can be considered the villain of the nihilist movement, 
that person is Sergei Nechaev. Nevhaev was a cunning, manipulative, and ruthless 
individual who served as an organizer, tactician, and ideologue for the nihilist movement. 
It is very likely that Nechaev was inspired to create his terrorist cell, called Narodnaya 
Rasprava (People’s Revenge), by the group led by Nicholas Ishutin and Ivan Khudyakov 
with which Karakozov had been associated.83  Compared to his ideological forebears, 
however, Nechaev was able to build a relatively large following.84  Interestingly, 
Nechaev was rather different from the sons of the wealthy that constituted much of his 
extremist circle. Nechaev was born in Ivanovo-Voznesensk to a bartender. Despite his 
modest background, Nechaev was able to attend university in Moscow and become a 
teacher in St. Petersburg.85  In St. Petersburg, Nechaev became acquainted with Peter 
Tkachev, a radical who had indirect connections with both Zaichnevsky and Karakozov 
and who believed that, in order for Russia to change, everyone over 25 years of age 
should be destroyed.86  Nechaev, armed with ambition and a fabricated background 
tailored to his political leanings, sought to gain control of and politicize the Petersburg 
student movements in the late 1860s.87  At roughly the same time, Nechaev was also able 
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to leverage the repressive political atmosphere to bring the attention of law enforcement 
on a number of political rivals.88  When the tsar’s hounds started to bark at Nechev’s own 
door, he had the good sense to leave Russia. It was this leave of absence that Nechaev 
used to generate the myth of his imprisonment, erstwhile meeting with Bakunin and 
producing his most notable works including Catechism of a Revolutionary and The 
People’s Justice.89 
In September 1869, Nehcaev returned to Moscow and begun cultivating his 
terrorist cell, in earnest. In the early phases, the group grew rapidly and the primary 
occupations of the members were to acquire new membership and procure funds, usually 
by intimidation, extortion, or fraud.90  Ironically, one of the first and only times that 
Nechaev’s group drew blood was from one of their own. In an attempt to generate 
commitment and loyalty, Nechaev demanded that Ivan Ivanov, a member of Rasprava 
and a man for whom Nechaev was known to have a deep enmity, was to be killed.91  On 
November 21, 1869 Nechaev and four accomplices murdered Ivanov in his apartment 
and ditched the body in a frozen pond. Authorities discovered the body on November 25 
and, by early December, had arrested all of the men who had participated in the murder, 
save for Nechaev, who had escaped abroad.92  The discovery of the body also led the 
police to the meeting location for the group in which they were able to find a list of 
members, many of whom were also arrested and put on trial in 1871.93  Nechaev evaded 
capture until the spring of 1872, and in 1873 he was convicted of murder and sentenced 
to twenty years hard labor. By secret order of the Tsar, Nechaev was actually sent to 
Petropavlovsk prison in St. Petersburg where he lived the last nine years of his life in 
solitary confinement.94 
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Happily, Nechaev and his followers were never able to carry out the darker side 
of their agenda. In fact, many Russians, including other brands of revolutionaries, were 
appalled by the behavior of members of Rasprava, particularly the murder of Ivanov.95  
The prosecution of the ring, however, was not a victory for the regime. On one hand, 
many radicalized students attended the trial of Nechaev’s followers and delivered 
impassioned and convincing pleas in favor of the defendants.96  On the other, when it 
came to light that Nechaev was secretly imprisoned in St. Petersburg instead of the 
prescribed exile, there was a pronounced objection among some sectors of the public in 
spite of the realization that even Siberia would not have held him for long.97  
C. WHAT IT MEANT TO BE A TERRORIST 
1. Profile of a Nihilist 
By and large, nihilism was a phenomenon that was most prevalent among college-
aged males from the upper classes. According to Philip Pomper, the median age of the 
individuals in Nechaev’s group was 22 years of age. Additionally, of the members whose 
backgrounds are known, a full 50 percent were from the gentry. Of the remainder of the 
members, all but roughly 13 percent were from backgrounds with relatively comfortable 
means.98  In some cases, it was a man’s noble background that Nechaev leveraged to 
induce him to join Narodnaya Rasprava. Nechaev was well known for playing on 
feelings of guilt among the upper classes for repressing the masses for so long.99  In other 
cases, Nechaev used the force of his own character and direct physical threat to drive 
compliance with his goals. Several of Nechaev’s followers claim to have been coerced to 
join the group at knifepoint.100 
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2. Mystique 
One of the characteristics that made nihilism unique among revolutionary groups 
that existed up to that point, was the degree to which it developed its own mythology. 
From Turgenev’s literary characters and Chernyshevsky’s new men to Nechaev’s 
fabricated tales of his own bravado, portrayals of the nihilist movement and its members 
had an almost lyrical quality. It is not difficult to imagine that the aura of adventure 
painted into the nihilist conspiracy made it attractive to many individuals, especially 
college-aged males looking for a purpose for their lives beyond books and lectures. It 
bears noting that some of the governmental abuses against which nihilists rallied were 
very real and socially pernicious, yet while the poor policies deserved opposition the 
approaches that the nihilists advocated were even more objectionable. Individuals like 
Nechaev were also singularly dedicated to their cause, for which many of his followers 
and later revolutionaries legitimately admired him.101  Thus, the individuals who drove 
the nihilist movement were, intentionally or otherwise, able to take advantage of the 
ideological currents of the time and package them in such a way that made murder and 
widespread rebellion acceptable to a notable slice of society.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Despite the bloodier motives of some of the movement’s ideologues, the nihilist 
movement generated limited social change and an even smaller body count. No 
wholesale murder a la Zaichnevski or Nechaev actually took place. In a more esoteric 
sense, however, the nihilist movement did generate some significant casualties. One of 
the most significant victims of the movement was the legitimacy of the regime. Even 
watershed actions like the abolition of serfdom in 1861 did not significantly improve the 
social situation; the agricultural class received a new title but little in the way of material 
gains. Additionally, the repressive and inconsistent ideological control exercised both 
before and during the 1860s only increased bitterness among progressive sections of 
society and galvanized student unrest. The regime, through missteps like civically 
executing Chernyshevsky and clandestinely modifying Nechaev’s sentence, also 
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inadvertently created martyrs for the movement. In many ways, the tsarist government 
confirmed and reinforced the suspicions of progressives and revolutionaries. Although 
the nihilists’ program stalled and the movement was somewhat delegitimized by the 
fratricide of Ivanov, later terrorist groups would rely on several of the same ideologues 
and even revive and polish the memory of individuals like Nechaev.102  Thus, though the 
nihilist movement did not achieve many of its goals, it did set a solid foundation upon 
which other revolutionary and terrorist groups would build in the near future. 
The example of the nihilists is largely in accordance with the hypothesis of the 
thesis because environmental influences generated grievances among the populace, 
ideologues capitalized on the social conditions to add force to their agendas, and 
individuals were sufficiently motivated to partake in the movement. During the time from 
1866 to 1871 in which the nihilists were most active, the repressive national atmosphere 
combined with the demonstrated weaknesses of the regime to create a great deal of public 
dissatisfaction. Ideologues like Chernyshevsky, Zaichnevsky, Bakunin, and Nechaev 
were able to use the social frustration as a springboard for their radical ideas, and many 
individuals, often college-age males, joined the movement for a variety of reasons 
including, ideological agreement, admiration for other participants in the movement, and 
sometimes a degree of coercion. The nihilists also contributed a number of ideas and 
techniques to future groups, most notably, the operation of a conspiracy and the 
beginnings of violent radical ideologies. Additionally, the nihilist phase produced martyrs 
who later groups could use to promote solidarity and action.             
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III. PHASE TWO:  THE POPULISTS 
The second major phase of Russian prerevolutionary terrorism was associated 
with the populist movement and occurred in the period stretching from 1878 to 1882.103 
Compared to the nihilist movement which was relatively narrow in terms of scope, 
membership, and ultimate effect, the populist movement was substantially broader and 
surpassed its predecessor in nearly all respects. The populist movement was based on a 
relatively mature ideological framework and comprised a larger segment of the 
population than did its nihilist predecessors. While women played a relatively small role 
in the nihilist movement, their contribution to populist terror was substantial and worthy 
of mention.104  Additionally, the populists were able to conduct a feat that the nihilists 
could not; a member of Narodnaya Volia, a populist terrorist group, assassinated Tsar 
Alexander II in March 1881.105  Populist terrorists also killed a number of other 
governmental officials and experimented with various tactics and means of self-
organization.106  The high-tide of populist terror lasted from 1878 to1882 and dealt a 
significant blow to the regime.107  As with the nihilists, the populist movement was 
influenced significantly by the environment from which it arose, was informed and 
comprised by a number of influential people and groups, and was able to generate an 
ideological magnetism that helped draw members and motivate them to do conduct the 
bloody business of terrorism.  
A. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
In many ways, the national environment faced by the populists was relatively 
similar to that faced by the nihilists. The wealthy were still wealthy, the poor were still 
poor, and the regime was still oppressive. Terrorism began to return to the toolkits of 
revolutionary groups in 1876, but even in the five years that had passed since the 
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dissolution of the Nechaev ring, a number of significant changes took place in the nation 
that affected radical groups.108 Some of the changes were a result of internal 
developments, external pressures caused others, and some were directly related to the 
populace and government’s experience with nihilism. Specifically, the main 
environmental factors that shaped the development of the populist terrorist movement 
was the regime’s enforcement methods, the changing public perspectives on radicalism 
and terror, the plight of women in higher education, and the further delegitimization of 
the regime due to the Russo-Turkish war. 
The nihilist period was somewhat short lived, but it did change certain features of 
the national environment and instruct future generations of radicals and terrorists. 
Ultimately, the only winners to emerge from Russia’s experience with nihilist terror were 
the populists. The nihilists lost because many ended up in prison or exile, the regime lost 
because it dealt with the nihilists in a manner that offended progressive members of the 
populace and drove even more individuals into the camps of other revolutionaries. The 
populists, in addition to being able to absorb many of the new radicals and 
revolutionaries, also benefitted from the nihilists lesson on how not to conduct a 
conspiracy.109  Unsurprisingly, the nihilist movement led to an increase in government 
efforts to police and control the populace which, although it made operations more 
difficult, continued to embitter the population, especially students. Beginning during the 
nihilist period and continuing thereafter, the Third Department, the Tsar’s secret police, 
stiffened its operations. In the early 1870s, even receiving subversive literature in the 
mail was grounds for arrest.110  Another reaction to the nihilist movement, which the 
government knew was comprised largely of students, was to enact further restrictions on 
universities and university students. One particularly acrimonious action by Alexander 
II’s regime was to cancel scholarships for many poor students who could not otherwise 
afford to attend university. The predictable result was new and ever-expanding waves of 
student protest. The regime elected to use soldiers to break up the demonstrations. The 
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soldiers often executed their mission with enthusiasm and violence, and, in the process of 
dispersing unruly formations and arresting instigators, beat up a significant number of 
students.111  The regime also dubiously blamed students for a series of arson attacks in 
St. Petersburg and responded with still more repression.112  The combination of the 
violent and repressive demeanor with which the regime approached students and the large 
number of poor former-students that were loath to go back to the provinces drove 
individuals to dissent groups in significant numbers.113  Initially, most of the student 
groups were peaceful, which probably saved the whole movement from being destroyed 
by government officials while still in embryonic form.114  In the longer-term context, 
however, the profusion of populist groups, even peaceful ones, meant that when terrorism 
did arise it was based on a more developed ideological and organizational framework 
which made it much more resilient to government control and more tactically efficient. 
In many ways, education and educational reforms proved to be the achilles heel of 
the tsarist government. Educational restrictions also had a significant impact on the entry 
of women into populist groups. The principle of radical equality in the ideals of the new 
man and the new family drew a limited number of women into the nihilist movement, but 
in most cases they did not participate in the Jacobinism that characterized nihilism’s 
darker side. In the populist movement, on the other hand, women figured quite 
prominently, even when it came to terrorist activities. Some of the primary motivators for 
women’s entry into the revolutionary sphere were the feminist movement and the 
prohibition of women from attending universities. By the 1870s, feminism was already a 
broad and well established movement that encompassed women from all stations of life. 
Although their trajectories did not entirely coincide, feminists found allies among 
revolutionary circles, and the two formed a sort of symbiotic relationship in which both 
movements were able to count on some degree of support from the other.115  Mere 
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association with radicals, however, was not sufficient to drive women to revolutionary 
groups in significant numbers; a grievance was necessary. Many women found just such 
a grievance in the workplace. Alexander II’s abolition of serfdom had the regrettable and 
unexpected effect of economically demolishing small-scale agriculture which forced 
great numbers of small landowners and former serfs, both men and women, to seek 
additional income elsewhere. Men, who could attend school or other training programs, 
fared relatively well, but women, who were barred from most traditional educational 
systems, met tremendous hardship.116  Some women found artels, or cooperatives, to be 
an expedient manner of receiving training and finding work or were even able to enter 
certain fields without education, but education remained the real prize.117  Throughout 
the early 1860s the national government and local communities experimented with a 
variety of methods for providing education to women from school age to university level. 
Ultimately, most of the attempts failed; some due merely to the lack of government 
funding, others as a result of direct government prohibition. The Third Department 
seemed particularly averse to women’s education. In 1862, by the urging of the secret 
police, Alexander II disbanded a system of volunteer schooling for the poor which 
educated and employed a substantial number of women.118  One of the last officially 
sanctioned bastions of women’s education were series of evening lectures open to the 
public that were offered from 1870 through 1875 in St. Petersburg. The offering ended as 
a result of a lack of funding, but was harassed by police throughout the time of its 
operation.119  By blocking access to education, the regime removed legitimate 
occupational options for many women and fostered a repressive atmosphere. Worse still, 
by allowing some programs for women’s education to exist only to later take them away 
or allow them to expire, the government deeply embittered the women who advocated or 
participated in such reforms. Limited employment options and grievances against the 
regime played directly into the hands of the populists, who greeted the frustrated and 
                                                 
116 Broido, Apostles into Terrorists, 47–48. 
117 Ibid., 47, 51. 
118 Ibid., 56. 
119 Ibid., 52–53. 
 33 
alienated women with open arms. Women terrorists would not only become some of the 
most significant members of the populist groups like Narodnaya Volia, but they would 
also figure prominently in revolutionary groups thereafter. 
While many of the regime’s woes are attributable to its own maladroit policies, it 
was also a victim of some bad luck. One example of the ill-fortune of Alexander II’s 
regime was the outbreak and resolution of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–1878. In 
something of a historical rarity, Russia was not an enthusiastic participant in the conflict. 
Domestic concerns and international realities clearly indicated that entry was not 
desirable, yet, due to the collapse of diplomatic recourses and an outpouring of domestic 
enthusiasm for protecting Slavic brethren, Russia entered the war in April 1877.120  
Ultimately, Russia won the war, but the end-state left much to be desired. Not only did 
the conflict last longer than expected, but the casualties were also distressingly high. 
Russia also suffered what was perceived as a major diplomatic defeat in the treaty 
terms.121  Due largely to the hectoring of Austria-Hungary and Britain, against whom 
Russia deeply hoped to avoid conflict, Russia had to change what would have been a 
highly favorable post-war arrangement. The final agreement was far less favorable for 
Russia and, most egregiously, allowed Britain and Austria-Hungary to acquire Balkan 
territory even though they had spent no blood or treasure on the conflict.122  In reality, 
Alexander II was not to blame; failure to cooperate with Britain and Austria-Hungary 
could have had much more serious consequences. A great many of the Russian subjects, 
however, did not grasp the greater diplomatic context and the Tsar was a convenient 
scapegoat.123  Thus, the outcome of the Russo-Turkish war gave the public another 
reason to see the government as weak and unable to defend the best interests of the 
nation. 
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Anyone who has kept a garden knows that, when clearing weeds, the whole weed 
must be removed; if the roots are left below the ground, the weed will regrow. Russia 
experienced a similar phenomenon in its battle against terror and radicalism. The regime 
was able to capture a relatively large number of terrorists and subversives, but some 
continued to evade government enforcement. Pyotr Zaichnevsky, even though 
imprisoned for a time, was able to move about Russia for much of his life and contribute 
to other revolutionary causes, to include that of the populists.124  To the Tsar’s unending 
chagrin, some revolutionaries were nearly untouchable because they lived outside of the 
country. Revolutionaries often gathered in Switzerland and were able to collaborate on 
techniques and ideology, write pamphlets, and make connections with other radicals.125  
As it were, Bakunin and other revolutionaries abroad functioned like weeds in a 
neighbor’s garden which invade others by means of the pollen of subversive literature 
carried by students acting as worker bees. Additionally, a tenacious remnant of extremists 
remained within Russia. As a result, Russia soon experienced a new outbreak of 
terrorism. 
Another troublesome development to appear in the 1870s was a growing public 
desensitization to or even acceptance of terrorism. While the lurid revelations from the 
trials of the Nechaev ring inspired disgust among much of society, the people became 
increasingly tolerant of it as the decade wore on. It is likely that, as time progressed, 
growing portions of the population grew to see that the regime did not necessarily have 
their best interests at heart and that a change was necessary. Public indifference to 
terrorism should not be viewed as a vote in favor of the populists; if anything, it was a 
vote of no-confidence in the Tsar and his system.  
As with the nihilist movement, the populist movement did not necessarily have 
mass public appeal, but it did benefit substantially from the national environment from 
whence it grew. As a result of clumsy policies by the government, especially in 
controlling dissent and regulating education, the populace had more than sufficient reason 
to doubt the Tsar’s efficacy. Alexander II also suffered from a degree of bad luck in the 
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form of the Russo-Turkish war. The Tsar had little choice but to get involved in the war 
and his armies were victorious, but his prudent acceptance of international realities in the 
resulting treaty infuriated many in the homeland. Populist groups also gained a great deal 
of benefit from the revolutionary continuity provided by radicals that remained at-large 
and the freedom of action granted by a relatively permissive populace. 
B. MAJOR IDEOLOGUES 
In a fundamental sense, the national environment in which the populists operated 
was not starkly different from that faced by the nihilists. As a result, environmental 
explanations may not be the most complete explanation of why and how the populist 
movement differed from its predecessor. One explanation of the differences in operation 
and outcomes between the movements is provided by the individuals and groups that 
comprised them. In large part, the nihilist movement was much more individual in nature 
than the populist movement. Populists tended to organize themselves into more cohesive 
groups which were better able to self-regulate than the conspiratorial cells that 
characterized nihilist organization. The populist movement also waited longer before 
resorting to violence, and when violence did arise the perpetrators conducted it with 
much greater organization, planning, and support which substantially increased its 
effectiveness.126   
1. Alexander Herzen 
According to Franco Venturi, “Herzen was the true founder of Populism.”127  
Herzen, a member of the intelligentsia, was a writer and an ideologue who viewed and 
portrayed populism with a human face. Both in-person and through correspondence, 
Herzen had contact with many members of prerevolutionary radical groups and provided 
a substantial amount of socialist ideological continuity. As a young man, Herzen 
witnessed the Decembrist revolt at the end of 1825 as well as the harsh manner in which 
the government stifled it. The failed revolt had a deep impact on Herzen, who grew to 
                                                 
126 Pomper, “Russian Revolutionary Terrorism,” 80. 
127 Venturi, Roots of Revolution, 1. 
 36 
own the Decembrist cause as his own.128  From a relatively young age, Herzen cultivated 
connections with other revolutionary individuals. Some of Herzen’s revolutionary 
relationships were deep and prolonged. Nicholas Ogarev and Herzen were childhood 
friends who collaborated on revolutionary matters intermittently beginning in their 
teenage years. While in their late twenties, Herzen, Ogarev, and Ogarev’s wife lived in 
the same home. The trio adhered to the notion of the new marriage, which facilitated 
extramarital liaisons between Herzen and Ogarev’s wife, a number of which produced 
children. Ogarev fully knew of the relationship between Herzen and his wife, but did not 
outwardly manifest hostility toward his colleague.129  Herzen also had a great many 
briefer, more superficial connections with other revolutionaries, especially from 1857–
1862 when his home became a “meeting place and object of pilgrimage,” for budding 
revolutionaries of the time.130  Although Herzen died in 1870, before the high-tide of 
Russian populism, contact with Herzen served as a common denominator between a large 
number of the individuals that participated in revolutionary movements.131  Herzen also 
made an impact on other generations of Russian radicals to include the nihilists and 
Bolsheviks, who did however approach him with some reservation.132 
Herzen’s personal correspondences were significant, if not symbolic, for many 
revolutionaries, but his greatest contributions to the revolutionary cause, especially that 
of the populists, were in his writings. In Roots of Revolution, Franco Venturi 
characterizes Herzen’s autobiography, entitled My Past and Thoughts, as contributing 
most significantly to the development of the populist ideology.133  Herzen’s framing of 
populism as a movement based on “personality rather than dogma” is clearly reflected in 
both his work and his life.134  Herzen’s autobiography, however, represents only a small 
segment of his broader literary contributions to the early revolutionary movement. 
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Herzen was also a prolific political journalist and critic and aired many of his views in his 
self-published periodicals, initially the Polar Star then The Bell.135  By 1860, The Bell 
had become one of the most significant publications for revolutionaries of all varieties. 
Although it was technically illegal to be in possession of the periodical, The Bell had a 
substantial body of readers within Russia that even included the Tsar and many other 
governmental officials. Obviously, the Tsar and his retinue did not read The Bell because 
they were revolutionaries but because the magazine served not only as a helpful gauge of 
popular opinion but also as a surprisingly accurate, albeit slanted, body of investigative 
reporting on the Russian government. Russian subjects could also contribute to the 
periodical, which they did in great numbers.136  
Significantly, while Herzen’s perspectives were clearly represented in the subject 
matter, The Bell was a remarkably moderate periodical. Ultimately, Herzen advocated for 
a populist system that emphasized agrarian socialism but eschewed Western styles of 
political authority.137  Absent from Herzen’s outlook on populism were violent 
conspiratorial organizations and universal populist doctrine. However, as the 1860s 
dawned and populism began to acquire more conspiratorial and action-oriented forms, 
Herzen’s influence began to wane. The revolutionary movements that occurred during 
that time and afterwards drew on Herzen for their ideological foundation, but abandoned 
his notions on the manner in which populism should be pursued and the form the 
resulting government should take.138 Even though the revolutionary movements departed 
from the core of Herzen’s image of populism, they repeatedly honored him as the founder 
of the movement.139  It is unlikely that Herzen would have approved of the ultimate 
trajectory of the populist movement, but it is impossible to know due to the time of his  
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death. Ultimately, Herzen’s legacy is that of an inventor whose creation, while initially 
benign, grew in unpredictable ways to become a new creature with a nature far more 
malevolent than initially intended. 
2. Narodniki 
One of the first major populist initiatives to take place after the conclusion of the 
nihilist movement was the “to the people” campaign of 1873–1874.140  At its core, the 
movement was intended to serve the joint purpose of bringing revolutionaries into contact 
with the Russian agricultural class and beginning to stir the passions of revolution among 
the laboring masses.141  Many of the individuals who partook in the campaign, called the 
narodniki based on the Russian name for the initiative “k narodu” (“to the people”), were 
in their teens or early twenties and were relatively new initiates to revolutionary 
circles.142  The narodniki left the cities to live and labor with the peasants, assuming that 
the peasants would be the greatest recipients of the benefits of revolution and, therefore, 
an easy target for radicalization. Regardless of their intentions, the reality of living 
among Russia’s common folk surprised many of the young revolutionaries, even ones 
who had prepared for the experience.143 Many of the aristocratically-born narodniki were 
entirely unsuited for the ardors of an agrarian life; many could not physically bear a day 
of labor or even imbibing of the homemade spirits that were ubiquitous in rural 
Russia.144  Ultimately, the movement stalled; many of the young radicals lost patience 
with their target audience, and the whole effort was based on a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the peasants. The peasants, in the infrequent times in which the 
revolutionaries were able to share their populist doctrine, did not see themselves as the 
oppressed and downtrodden individuals that the revolutionaries had assumed that they 
were. In fact, most peasants continued to see the Tsar as their great benefactor and kind 
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ruler and did not view most wealthy peasants as predatory kulaks.145  As a result, the 
perspective of the narodniki toward the peasants was often a condescending one.146  The 
movement ended in 1874 with a massive wave of arrests of the populist missionaries.147  
While the movement was unsuccessful in its larger aims of inciting peasant rebellion, it 
did have some other unexpected effects. Most significantly, the narodnik campaign 
served as a training ground and ideological cultivator for a significant portion of the 
individuals who would later become members of the groups Land and Freedom and 
Narodnaya Volia.148  
3. Land and Freedom 
To speak of the group Land and Freedom is actually to speak of two separate 
groups. The first Land and Freedom was formed in 1861 as a collaborative effort between 
radicals in London and St. Petersburg. The group was influenced heavily by a variety of 
contemporary revolutionary publications including The Bell and The Contemporary, and, 
according to Adam Ulam, it was “the closest thing to an underground revolutionary party 
Russia had [theretofore] ever known.”149  The first Land and Freedom endeavored to 
create fertile soil for a large-scale peasant revolt, but was relatively muted in its calls for 
violence or an immediate revolution.150  Initially, the Tsar’s Third Department had 
practically no knowledge of the Land and Freedom organization, but some of the party’s 
leaders and ideologues were on the police’s radar. Herzen, Ogarev, Bakunin, 
Chernyshevsky, Serno-Solovievich, and other radicals were well known and not well-
liked by the police.151  Due to the arrest of Chernyshevsky and Serno-Solovievich and 
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the fading influence of Herzen, the first Land and Freedom expired in the spring of 1863 
before it could provoke any serious or widespread unrest.152 
While the first Land and Freedom was primarily an exercise in building ideology 
and organization, the second Land and Freedom was far more active. Revived following 
the collapse of the narodnik campaign in 1874, the second Land and Freedom marked the 
return of terror and conspiracy to the arsenal of revolutionary groups.153  In large part, 
Land and Freedom was born out of a crisis of the populist movement; the “to the people” 
campaign had been a disappointing failure and the peaceful methods upon which the 
movement had thence far been predicated met public indifference and official repression. 
The fortunes of the movement changed, however, as the trials of the arrested narodniki 
began. The trials, in fact, were a colossal victory for the movement. The public and the 
judiciary fell on the side of the populists and the Tsar fell on the side of the hated secret 
police. The Tsar’s actions once again embittered the people and ignited a vengeance 
among many of the populists.154  Land and Freedom was born in the fall of 1876, and by 
that time many of its members no longer had the patience for bringing about change in a 
peaceful fashion.155  In the relatively brief lifespan of the organization, Land and 
Freedom’s constituent cells launched the first real wave of political violence in 
prerevolutionary Russia. Land and Freedom’s murderous campaign was highly 
ambitious; the organization placed a target on the head of the Tsar, ordered assassinations 
of a variety of state and local officials, and even discussed plans as great as using 
dynamite to blow up the Winter Palace.156  Land and Freedom was unable to meet its 
more extreme goals, but members of the organization did kill a substantial number of 
government and police officials.157  One of the highest profile attacks of the period was 
Vera Zasulich’s attempted assassination of General Trepov, the governor of St. 
Petersburg, in January of 1878. The event was not remarkable for the attempt, for 
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Zasulich failed to kill him even though she fired from point blank range, but for the 
outcome.158  Naturally, other liberals and revolutionaries supported Zasulich, but a 
stunning percentage of the general population came out in her favor, as well. In a show 
trial characterized by extreme public interest and impassioned addresses from both 
Zasulich and other revolutionaries, the defendant turned the tables on the victim and put 
Trepov and, by extension, the whole tsarist system on trial.159  Ultimately, the jury found 
Zasulich not guilty of the assassination attempt, which stunned authorities and 
revolutionaries, alike.160  Revolutionaries were substantially emboldened by the affair, 
and once again, the regime was painted as the villain.161  
It is important to note that Land and Freedom was at no time a monolithic 
organization; it was factionalized from the beginning. Some sections of Land and 
Freedom’s membership repudiated violence throughout the life of the organization, and 
others, adhering to concepts laid out by Nechaev and Bakunin, believed that violence was 
the only way to achieve their goal.162  Moreover, the groups were divided geographically 
which also limited uniformity in both ideology and practice. In 1879, Land and Freedom 
split into two groups. One group, called the Black Repartition (Chorniy Peredel) did not 
accept terrorism as a legitimate tactic and instead sought to continue the program of the 
narodniki by seeking to radicalize the peasants. The other faction called itself Narodnaya 
Volia (People’s Will) and became one of the most active and violent terrorist groups of 
the period.163  In spite of Land and Freedom’s factionalism, it did however pioneer a 
number of organizational tendencies that other groups would borrow and elaborate upon. 
Most significantly, Land and Freedom adopted practices of secrecy and enforced internal 
order through brutal punishments for spies and informants.164  The extent of Land and 
Freedom’s control over its members was limited, however. In 1879, Alexander Solovev, 
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a member of Land and Freedom, attempted to assassinate the Tsar, but did so without 
seeking approval or support from the organization. 
4. Narodnaya Volia (People’s Will) 
Narodnaya Volia is perhaps the most significant case study of a terrorist group 
during the populist period. Narodnaya Volia was the primary group and perpetrator of 
terrorism in the period that stretched from 1878 through 1882 which is known as “the 
crisis of the autocracy.”165  During that time, terrorists killed a large number of state 
officials, including the Tsar, and generated a great deal of panic in all sectors of 
government. Compared with earlier terrorist groups, Narodnaya Volia was the most 
mature and sophisticated terrorist organization. The organization adopted corporate 
practices like the division of labor and had a more definitive program than most of their 
ideological forebears. Like previous groups, Narodnaya Volia ultimately desired a 
socialist state, but, unlike their predecessors, acknowledged that a constitutional period 
was first necessary.166  It is important to note, moreover, that while many historians 
question the sanity of some earlier terrorists, most members of Narodnaya Volia, 
especially its leading figures, were perceived as individuals of sound and rational 
mind.167  Of particular interest is the fact that many significant members of Narodnaya 
Volia, to include Sofia Perovskaya and Andrei Zhelyabov, ultimately disapproved of 
terrorism but accepted it at the time for the sake of the group and the cause. Even the role 
or terrorist actions changed in Narodnaya Volia. Rather than using terrorism as a podium 
to propagate their social ideology, terrorism was an end in and of itself.168 
Narodnaya Volia, especially in its earlier years was a very busy organization. In 
addition to the substantial number terrorist actions its members perpetrated, the group 
also engaged in a rather ingenious program of deception and espionage. With its 
revamped structure and motivation, Narodnaya Volia conducted its acts of terrorism with 
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an order and precision that surpassed any of its predecessors. The organization’s 
sectionalized structure allowed some individuals to specialize in explosives, others could 
specialize in propaganda, and still others could tend to the organizations administration or 
labor on the groups publication, The People’s Will.169  For its acts of terror, the target set 
did not change much from previous populist groups. Nearly any government official was 
eligible to have a death warrant levied upon him by Narodnaya Volia’s Executive 
Committee. However, due to the group’s favored method of strike, dynamite, many lower 
level government functionaries were killed, as well.170  Unsurprisingly, Tsar Alexander II 
was the organization’s primary target; the group had condemned him to death as one of 
its earliest actions in 1879.171  Narodnaya Volia haunted the Tsar, conducting seven 
assassination attempts between 1879 and 1881 when the eighth attempt finally achieved 
its goal.172  Although terrorism was the primary output of the organization, it also 
displayed an impressive penchant for deception and espionage. Especially early in its 
existence, the members of Narodnaya Volia went through substantial efforts to give the 
appearance of a much larger conspiracy. In reality, the Executive Committee was simply 
the part of Narodnaya Volia that determined the docket for assassinations, but through 
skillful misinformation and deception the revolutionaries cast the two as unique entities. 
Moreover, Narodnaya Volia cast a shade of mystery around the Executive Committee by 
never claiming membership or connection to it. Thus, for the first couple years of 
Narodnaya Volia’s existence, authorities perceived the Executive Committee as a 
mysterious organization about which they had very little information and from which a 
member was never captured.173  Narodnaya Volia also had significant successes in 
espionage. The group collected a tremendous amount of information on the Tsar’s 
political police and was even able to place assets in the department, itself. Alexander  
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Mikhailov, Narodnaya Volia’s master spy, was ultimately caught, but not before 
providing his group with a great deal of intelligence on Third Department operations and 
tactics.174 
The assassination of a head of state is a notable historical occasion in its own 
right, but the historical legacy of Narodnaya Volia is much broader than a single high-
profile murder. In the long-term, Narodnaya Volia made the regime an enemy of itself 
and set several important precedents for future movements. In many ways, the regime 
met its bête noir in Narodnaya Volia. Terrorism left the Tsar no positive policy options. 
Allowing the attacks to continue unabated was never an option for the regime, and all 
police crackdowns ever seemed to achieve was a greater radicalization of revolutionaries. 
As Adam Ulam states, Narodnaya Volia “destroyed its [the regime’s] power to reform 
itself.”175  Perhaps the most significant legacy of Narodnaya Volia was its self-
identification as a party. The notion of being a party substantially increased the group’s 
cohesion and deepened individual obedience and commitment. One of the hugely 
consequential ideas to arise from Narodnaya Volia was the concept of partiinost.176  
There is no specific English word that captures the denotative and connotative meaning 
of partiinost, but it is most closely described as the feeling of pride, dedication, and 
obligation derived from membership in a party. The concept of partiinost was later used 
by the Communist Party to substantial effect. 
5. Women Revolutionaries 
One feature of the populist movement that made it so unique was the substantial 
degree of participation by women. Women figured prominently not only as members in 
the groups but also in their leadership and even the direct participation in acts of 
terrorism. Three of the most significant women in the movement were Vera Zasulich, 
Vera Figner, and Sofia Perovskaya. All three women enjoyed long and productive careers 
in the revolutionary business. Vera Zasulich entered the revolutionary world through her 
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acquaintance with Sergei Nechaev and was a member of both Land and Freedom and the 
Socialist Revolutionary party.177  Zasulich is best known for her assassination attempt on 
General Trepov, but later grew to disdain terrorism as a tactic of social change.178  Vera 
Figner had perhaps the longest and broadest career of any female revolutionary in the 
populist period. Figner was an active participant in the narodnik movement and was also 
a member of Narodnaya Volia. Notably, Figner was a leading personality in the 
Executive Committee of Narodnaya Volia and was influential in planning terrorist 
actions. In 1883, an informant denounced Figner, leading to her arrest and subsequent 
imprisonment.179 Sofia Perovskaya, a would-be poster-child for the St. Petersburg gentry, 
was another significant contributor to the populist cause. At a young age, she became 
interested in nihilism and grew more and more involved as her years advanced.180  
Perovskaya successfully evaded incarceration for revolutionary activities several times, 
but joined Narodnaya Volia somewhat reluctantly due to its violent proclivities.181  Fate 
finally caught up with Perovskaya in 1881 when she was arrested and subsequently 
hanged in connection with the assassination of Alexander II.182  Many other women were 
also involved in revolutionary activities during the populist period, at one point making 
up nearly a third of the Executive Committee of Narodnaya Volia, and their contributions 
to the movement were no less significant than those of males.183      
C. WHAT IT MEANT TO BE A TERRORIST 
1. Profile of a Populist 
As with the nihilist movement, the ranks of populist revolutionaries fell into a 
relatively uniform demographic profile. In large part, populist revolutionaries were 
children of the wealthy urban class and many were university students or former 
                                                 
177Pomper, “Russian Revolutionary Terrorism,” 77; Ulam, In the Name of the People,  273. 
178 Pomper, 78. 
179 Broido, Apostles into Terrorists, 186–187, 202. 
180 Ibid., 75–76. 
181 Ibid., 183–184,  
182 Ibid., 201. 
183 Ibid., 183. 
 46 
university students. Whereas nihilist revolutionaries were primarily male, the populists 
counted many women among their number. Additionally, the majority of populists were 
unmarried and had no children. The social composition of populist revolutionaries is very 
important because it reveals a number of things about the nature of the populist 
movement and about terrorist movements, in general. In a very practical sense, the 
children of privilege engaged in radicalism because they could. Populist terrorists were, 
by and large, free from obligations that would otherwise have slowed their path towards 
radicalism. Most populist terrorists did not have a family to feed, a career to cultivate, or 
an estate to manage. More significantly, populist revolutionaries were individuals of 
means. Maintaining an extremist organization is a very expensive undertaking. Printing 
publications, moving people around a country, and acquiring the materials necessary to 
conduct acts of terrorism are all expensive and would have been outside of the financial 
abilities of the majority of the Russian population. Thus, populist revolutionaries 
combined their unique set of resources and liberties to craft a highly destructive 
movement.     
2. Motivations 
In some cases, however, populist revolutionaries did face higher barriers to entry 
into the revolutionary world than did their predecessors. The course of the populist 
movement was characterized by increasing levels of violence in all sectors. Police 
brutality grew steadily over the populist period; suspected radicals were beaten harshly 
when apprehended and the use of torture on prisoners increased greatly in frequency.184  
In addition, the severity of legal sentencing also increased substantially over the populist 
period. While nihilists usually received relatively modest prison sentences or exile, long 
prison sentences or execution became the norm by around 1880.185  Populist 
revolutionaries also faced much higher levels of violence among their own revolutionary 
comrades. If a member of a populist revolutionary group was suspected of being a spy or 
traitor for the regime, he or she faced savage beatings, probably to the point of death. One 
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such case was that of Nicholas Gorinovich. Fellow members of his revolutionary cell had 
reason to believe that Gorinovich was an informer, so they beat him with blackjacks, 
splashed acid in his face, and left him for dead. Gorinovich miraculously survived, albeit 
horribly disfigured, and told tsarist authorities everything he knew about the group.186  
Populist terrorists were even a danger to themselves. Especially once Narodnaya Volia 
came into full-scale operations, dynamite was the favored method of conducting 
assassinations. At the time, explosives technology was very primitive, so the bombs 
posed great danger to the individuals who made them and the individuals that used them, 
called throwers.187  In Alexander II’s assassination and in many others, the thrower was 
among the casualties.188  Even though the environment was much harsher for the 
populists, the movement was still able to attract a great number of individuals. 
3. Mystique 
It is unsurprising that most groups that are involved in socially objectionable 
activities also partake in a relatively high degree of self-idealization and the populists 
were no exception. Internally, the movement sought to glorify members who 
accomplished great feats or gave their lives for the cause. According to Philip Pomper, 
populists “created the image of the virtuous assassin.”189  Interestingly, the notion spread 
outside of the group, as well. The outrageous public celebration of Zasulich’s acquittal 
serves as a clear example. Vera Broido, in her book, Apostles into Terrorists, repeatedly 
mentions the warm and human characteristics of the women who partook in the 
movement.190  Thus, the populists were able to craft an internal and external mythology 
that added to both its ranks and public approval. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
Despite a tenuous foundation, the populist movement was the first true harbinger 
of the demise of the Romanov Dynasty and state. The physical damage that the 
movement did to the regime, was substantial, but the political damage it did was far 
greater. The activities of populist revolutionaries left Alexander II with no good options; 
reforms had been illusory, inaction was never an option, and repression merely 
entrenched the opposition. Even repression could not stop the tide of populist terror 
which continued in spite of police brutality and severe legal consequences. Populism also 
served to bring terrorism into mainstream society and even met a degree of public 
approval. Perhaps the most significant invention of populism was the notion of partiinost 
which became an enduring feature of the revolutionary toolkit in promoting internal 
cohesion and loyalty. In short, the populist movement carried radicalism out of the 
estranged obscurity of nihilism and brought it to the public eye in a stark and visceral 
manner. 
As was the case with the nihilists, analyzing the populists through the lenses of 
environmental influences, the actions of ideologues, and individual motivations provides 
an effective understanding of the movement. The national situation, specifically the 
regime’s responses to nihilism, educational restrictions on women, growing public 
acceptance of violence against the regime, and the embarrassment of the Russo-Turkish 
War, gave the populist theorists and groups the raw materials with which to create a 
robust revolutionary enterprise. Additionally, even though the potential dangers were 
much higher for the populists than for nihilists, many young and wealthy individuals 
joined the movement. Two of the most significant principles to arise during the populist 
phase were the concepts of the virtuous assassin and partiinost. The notion of the 
virtuous assassin drew many individuals into extremist groups and promoted both group 
cohesion and the self-actualization of members. Partiinost played a large role in 
promoting compliance among group members to leadership directives and even induced 
some members that disapproved of violence to engage in acts of terrorism. Significantly, 
both concepts propagated to future terrorist groups within Russia and beyond.       
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IV. PHASE THREE:  THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES 
The third and final phase of prerevolutionary terrorism in Russia is associated 
with the Socialist Revolutionary (SR) Party and took place primarily between 1901 and 
1908. Around the turn of the 20th century, after a reprieve of nearly twenty years, the 
SRs rekindled the fires of terrorism and launched the longest and most destructive terror 
campaign to occur in Russia before the 1917 revolution. The Socialist Revolutionary 
Party became the bearer of the revolutionary torch following the slow death of 
Narodnaya Volia, but while the SRs inherited an old role, they brought it into a new 
social and national situation. While Narodnaya Volia was able to kill Alexander II, they 
could not kill his far less accommodating son, Tsar Alexander III. Alexander III died of 
natural causes in 1894 after having essentially overturned his predecessors liberalizing 
reforms.191  Narodnaya Volia’s demise was also characterized by increasing 
factionalization among revolutionaries. However, while earlier splits yielded groups that 
disagreed on tactics but usually remained relatively conciliatory, break-away groups from 
Narodnaya Volia were more polarized and even came into conflict with one another.192  
The same period also saw the birth of new revolutionary parties, including the Social 
Democrats who imported German-style Marxism into Russia, and later the liberal 
Constitutional Democratic (Kadet) Party, which included in its ranks many educated and 
wealthy members of society.193  The primary outbreak of terror during the period was 
from roughly 1901 through 1908, with the fiercest, multi-party violence occurring from 
1905 to 1907.194  The Combat Organization of the Socialist Revolutionary Party was 
founded in 1901 and was the first formalized entity to employ the tactic of terrorism in 
the new century. The first high-profile assassination that the Combat Organization 
conducted took place in 1902 and targeted the Interior Minister, Dimitrii Sipiagin.195   
Like its terrorist forefathers, however, the Socialist Revolutionary Party ultimately 
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debilitated itself by sullying its public image and provoking another crackdown by the 
regime. Moreover, the revelations in 1909 that Evno Azef, theretofore believed by 
revolutionaries to be an influential leader in the SR Party and Combat Organization, was 
a spy for the Okhrana destroyed the perception of honor among revolutionary 
terrorists.196 
A. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
While the historical conditions were relatively uniform between the nihilist and 
populist periods, the Socialist Revolutionaries existed in a time of accelerating national 
change. By 1901, the year of the Socialist Revolutionary Party’s founding, the tsarist 
system was already rapidly on its way to collapse.197  Strictly speaking, the twenty years 
between Narodnaya Volia’s assassination of Alexander II and the beginning of the SR 
wave of violence, were free from large-scale political bloodshed, but that does not mean 
that they were inconsequential. In fact, the two decades of apparent peace had a 
substantial influence on the structure and practice of the SRs. Due largely to the 
assassination of Alexander II, the reign of Alexander III was a harsh and reactionary one. 
Alexander III presided over a much expanded security system that included a newly 
reconstituted security police called the Okhrana. Additionally, the death throes of 
Narodnaya Volia promoted the growth of new revolutionary parties which added levels 
of complexity to the revolutionary environment. In 1894, Nicholas II was the last Tsar to 
come to the throne and brought with him a new style of rule.198  Whether by omission, 
commission, or misfortune on the part of the Tsar, the early years of the twentieth century 
were rife with events that fanned the flames of revolution and violence. Continuing 
urbanization, racial tensions, famines, and epidemics all led to growing agricultural and 
industrial unrest which merged with mass dissatisfaction over the Russo-Japanese War to 
produce the attempted revolution of 1905, the end of absolute monarchy, and a colossal 
outbreak of violence from 1905 to 1907, extinguished only by massive repression on the 
                                                 
196 Pomper, “Russian Revolutionary Terrorism,” 97. 
197 Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill, 45. 
198 Ibid., 3. 
 51 
part of the government. In short, the Socialist Revolutionary program both benefitted 
from and contributed to the inflammatory nature of the times. 
One reality that is neglected by planners of all types is that the opposition almost 
always has a rebuttal. Russian terrorist and revolutionary groups were repeatedly a victim 
of that phenomenon. In fact, terrorist groups and police entities existed in a type of self-
intensifying cycle. Increased levels of dissent or terrorism led to increased harshness and 
repressiveness from the law-enforcement mechanism which fueled further attacks from 
oppositionists, resetting the cycle. Ironically, the actions of earlier terrorist groups like 
Land and Freedom and Narodnaya Volia precipitated a substantial strengthening of the 
police forces which would later dismantle the revolutionary organizations piece-by-
piece.199  In 1880, Alexander II disbanded the Third Department and replaced it with the 
far larger and more capable Okhrana. Tactically, the Okhrana was able to build upon 
previous experience fighting terrorists and incorporate new techniques like using agents 
provocateurs and organizing counter-revolutionary activities among workers.200  The 
department became a major tool for Alexander III’s crackdown on opposition and 
deserves a large portion of the credit for the period of relative stability that closed the 
nineteenth century. The Okhrana also foiled several assassination attempts on Alexander 
III.201  However, as for the terror-police cycle, it was only a matter of time until the 
forces of revolution attained a critical mass of manpower and knowledge that would 
allow open violence to burst forth once again. In addition to pent-up aggression, the SRs’ 
ability to perpetrate violence was also assisted by the advancement of technology. As the 
twentieth century dawned, the size of bombs decreased and making them became easier 
and safer. As a result, would-be terrorists and terrorist groups were able to acquire bombs 
in greater number and with less chance of being caught by police in the process.202  
Despite their efficacy, the police were also vulnerable to a few of their own tactics. The 
SRs were eventually able to turn some of the Okhrana’s agents and infiltrate it with a few 
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of their own. Famous double agents like Evno Azef and Georgii Gapon served both the 
revolutionaries and the police at various intervals and typified the confusion and 
complexity of the times.203       
Considering the intensity of Narodnaya Volia in the period between 1878 and 
1881, the period of halcyon afterwards is quite notable. Despite appearances, however, 
the regime’s monopoly on social order in that time was merely a façade. Narodnaya 
Volia was falling apart due to internal divides and police depredation, but revolutionary 
feeling still burned strongly, albeit subliminally, in many corners of society. In the period 
between 1881 and 1901 the Russian revolutionary environment was characterized by the 
profusion of a number of different groups and parties. One of the most significant groups 
to appear in the last two decades of the nineteenth century was the Social Democrats. In 
contrast to Narodnaya Volia, the Social Democrats were not populists, but derived their 
ideology specifically from Karl Marx. The Social Democrats also represented a new 
brand of dissident that turned their eyes from the agrarian narod to the urban proletariat, a 
precedent that would have a deep impact on the course of Russian history.204  The 
ideological roots of the Social Democrats were much more European than previous 
radical movements, and initially refuted both violence and regime change.205  As with 
previous revolutionary groups, Social Democrats were prone to factionalism, both 
geographically and ideologically. Social Democracy first gained traction in St. Petersburg 
then spread to Moscow and then to the provinces as the 1880s gave way to the 1890s.206  
Moreover, Social Democrats could espouse any of a relatively wide range of tactical and 
ideological options. Two of the most consequential axes of ideological differentiation 
among the groups were their perspectives on the role Marxism should play vis-à-vis the 
state apparatus, and their perspectives on terrorism. Some groups believed that it was 
unnecessary to overthrow the regime, and sought instead an agreement with the sovereign 
that would better provide for the welfare of laborers. Other Social Democratic factions 
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accorded with Marx’s ideal of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” which necessarily 
implies regime change.207  Despite their differences, however, the divides among the 
Social Democrats were much less acrimonious than those of previous revolutionary 
groups.208  By the dawn of the 20th century, the majority of Social Democrats, at least 
tacitly, approved of terrorism as a tactic among other groups, but they varied in their 
willingness to directly support or perpetrate violence on their own.209  During the reign 
of Alexander III, the broad ideological and geographical dispersion of new and old 
revolutionary groups was not conducive to the direct perpetration of terrorism, but was 
well-suited to protect and incubate radical ideologies.             
In addition to being physically imposing, Tsar Alexander III was also a man of 
nearly immovable convictions and he applied both in his politics.210  Strength was 
undoubtedly the prevailing theme of Alexander III’s reign. Nicholas II, Alexander III’s 
eldest son and the last Tsar of Russia, however, was very different form his father. 
Although a man of discipline and devotion, Nicholas II lacked the force and resolve of 
his father and, as a result, was unable to maintain even the appearance of order in Russia 
during his reign.211  In addition to his inadequacies as a ruler, Nicholas II presided over a 
time that was more tumultuous than nearly any in previous Russian history. In addition to 
the rash of terror from 1901–1908, the last Tsar also had to deal with tensions from 
industrialization, agricultural unrest, Jewish pogroms, the Russo-Japanese War, and a 
small-scale revolution in 1905. Two of the most significant influences on the trajectory of 
the terror outbreak in the first decade of the 20th century were Russia’s industrialization 
and the agricultural woes of the 1890s. Alexander III’s reign was a time of massive 
industrialization which caused a pronounced growth of urban centers and a major 
expansion of the industrial proletariat.212  Industrialization was a mixed blessing for 
Russia. On one hand, an industrialization phase was necessary if Russia wished to be a 
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world power, but on the other, it substantially simplified the task of revolutionaries, 
especially once the Social Democrats began to turn their eyes on industrial workers as the 
fodder for revolution. The evidence of industrialization is evident in the social 
composition of the SR Party. In comparison to previous revolutionary groups, the SRs 
were poorer, more industrial and more urban. Additionally, urban locales were almost 
always the primary centers of terror campaigns.213  Cities alone, however, were not the 
only locations where unrest emerged; in the late 1880s and early 1890s, the harmful 
effects of the emancipation of the peasants were beginning to manifest themselves in 
significant ways. Nearly all peasants owed heavy debts and had to severely over-farm 
their land to have any hope of paying them. That trend coincided with a growing rural 
population which further reduced the amount of land with which each peasant could 
work.214  To complete the dire situation, there was a pronounced famine from 1891–
1892. Moreover, growing literacy and greater connections to urban-dwellers made 
peasants more amenable to radical propaganda.215  To a degree, Nicholas II was merely 
the unfortunate inheritor of the issues associated with industrialization and the 
inflammatory situation in the provinces, but he seemed equally unable to address the 
issues during his reign. 
Another unique feature of the Socialist Revolutionary Party and its period of 
terrorism was the unprecedentedly large participation of Jews. On one level, analysts like 
Anna Geifman paint Jews as a variety of natural revolutionary because of their 
“messianic ideal” in which the Jewish nation is destined to create an earthly paradise.216  
In that light, idealistic or millennial notions like those of Karl Marx or other 
revolutionary groups would reasonably assert a substantial influence on the Jewish 
population. At the same time, the Jewish participation in the SR wave of terror can also 
be explained as the response to several vicious waves of anti-Jewish pogroms that took 
place first in the 1880s and later in 1903 and 1905. The unprovoked and brutal attacks on 
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Jewish lives and property provided a very legitimate grievance against the government 
and drove many Jews into the ranks of revolutionary movements.217  It is also important 
to note that, like many members of terrorist groups, Jews were socially, politically, and 
economically isolated from the broader Russian society. Jews were even geographically 
isolated from the rest of the Russian population; the majority of Russian Jews were 
legally restricted to residence in towns and settlements in what was called the Pale of 
Settlement located in Western Russia.218  In many cases, downtrodden Jews saw few 
alternatives to the life of a revolutionary.219  Thus, as was the case with the women of the 
populist phase, the regime gave Jews a very limited range of legitimate options for 
making a living and expressing their political beliefs which motivated many to take up 
the flag of extremism and violence. 
Nicolas II’s government most clearly demonstrated its weakness by severely 
faltering in its handling of the Russo-Japanese War and the attempted revolution of 1905. 
Russia had a number of legitimate economic interests in the Far East, but, in a classic 
example of overextension and clumsy policy, Russia bumbled into war with Japan in 
1904. The Japanese, perceived by nearly all Russians as ethnically inferior to the point of 
caricature, achieved victory after victory and laid waste to the Russian navy. The 
Japanese momentum only flagged once it met the central mass of the Russian army. By 
1905, the Japanese lacked the depth of manpower and finances to defeat the Russian 
army, and the Russians were badly demoralized and politically crippled by unrest in the 
capitol. The two sides broke the stalemate in August 1905 with the Treaty of Portsmouth 
which was surprisingly favorable for Russia.220  Despite the relatively acceptable 
outcome of the treaty, the war had done great damage. By the war’s end, the situation for 
the regime was dire; the wave of SR terrorism was already well-advanced and the public 
outrage over Russia’s humiliating performance against the supposedly inferior Japanese 
elevated domestic dissatisfaction to a fever-pitch. 
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By the end of the Russo-Japanese war, much of society had lost faith in the 
regime and needed only a small push to join the camp of open opposition. Such a push 
came on January 22, 1905, in what became known as Bloody Sunday.221  The 
conflagration began when a large group of workers and their families gathered and began 
to march towards the Winter Palace with a petition for the Tsar. Unbeknownst to the 
demonstrators, Nicholas II was not at the Winter Palace that day, but the royal residence 
was still under guard. The demonstration was not violent but was very large, and as the 
marchers neared the palace nervous police opened fire on the crowd, killing well over a 
hundred and wounding hundreds more.222  In its own right, Bloody Sunday was a major 
historical landmark because it launched the Revolution of 1905, but deeper details 
illuminate that it was even more significant in the context of the battle between the state 
and revolutionary terrorists. In many ways, the incident was a colossal victory for the 
Socialist Revolutionaries even though they played no direct role on January 22. Most of 
the demonstrators, in fact, were not revolutionaries at all; they marched toward the palace 
“with icons and the Tsar’s portraits, as faithful subjects, nay, children, of their sovereign, 
begging him for redress and help.”223  In a profound irony, the procession was led by 
Georgii Gapon, an influential priest who was also in the employ of the Okhrana as a pro-
monarch organizer.224  Thus, a man tasked with agitating for the regime and leading a 
group of loyalists ended up providing some of the most effective fodder for revolutionary 
sentiment. It is likely that SR terrorist activity played into the violent response by the 
palace guards, without which the tragedy would not have taken place. By 1905, the wave 
of SR terror had been a feature of Russian life for nearly four years, and, although police 
were not then common targets, many had surely witnessed the brazen attacks on tsarist 
officials in the preceding years.225  After 1905, however, countless Russian law-
enforcement personnel were either primary or secondary victims of terrorist bombs. In 
some cases, a bomb blast was even a merciful end; SR terrorists were also fond of 
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dousing policemen with sulfuric acid which would cause a lifetime of pain and 
disfigurement.226  Thus, it is not difficult to imagine the tremendous uneasiness of the 
Winter Palace guards as they watched a very large mass of people approach them that 
January morning. 
One of the regime’s responses to the 1905 Revolution was to grant one of the 
most long-standing goals of regime oppositionists:  a popular legislative assembly. In the 
Imperial Manifesto of October 17, 1905, Nicholas II founded the State Duma.227  
Unfortunately for the Tsar, the concession did not have the intended effects; to the 
contrary, the greatest violence took place after the October Manifesto. Terrorists around 
the empire killed or wounded a staggering 3,611 tsarist officials and many more civilians 
in the year after decree, and recorded similar numbers each year until the outbreak 
slowed at the end of 1907.228  To some, the result of the legislative concession was 
perplexing; theoretically, the terrorists should have subsided when their demands were 
met. In reality, however, the terrorist groups perceived the move as a retreat on the part of 
the government and grew even more resolved to achieve radical structural change.229  
Moreover, while the Combat Organization of the SR Party was almost the sole 
perpetrator of terror from 1901 through 1905, revolutionaries from many other factions 
joined the fray once the regime countenanced what they perceived as weakness in the 
Imperial Manifesto.230  Thus, by 1905, terrorists had, once again, placed the regime in a 
place in which it had no good options; even a conciliatory move by the Tsar spawned 
increased violence. 
While the twenty years of relative quiet after the assassination of Alexander II 
may have seemed to represent a victory for the regime, it was actually an incubation 
period for the much more severe wave of terrorism that took place from 1901 to 1908. 
The SRs entered an environment that was characterized by a new Tsar, revamped law 
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enforcement, and plentiful oppositionist groups. Moreover, revolutionaries of the time 
received a substantial benefit from the industrial revolution which not only brought more 
people to the cities but also promoted new technologies that could be used in acts of 
terrorism. Even provincial Russia, theretofore a bastion of monarchism, was beginning to 
drift away from its presumed imperial benefactor. Agricultural woes and greater literacy 
drew the peasants away from the tsarist camp and vicious pogroms and government-
sponsored isolation drove Jews into the arms of extremists. Finally, horrendous imperial 
missteps like the Russo-Japanese War and Bloody Sunday dissipated what little social 
credit the government had left. Even the appeasement measure of founding a popular 
legislative body failed to stem the violence. In short, the Socialist Revolutionaries entered 
a scene that was well-primed for violence, and they took full advantage of their situation 
and contributed to even greater violence as the movement matured. 
B. MAJOR IDEOLOGUES 
To a large degree, the Socialist Revolutionaries were shaped and facilitated by 
their environment. The tumult and dissatisfaction that were endemic to the era were a 
substantial benefit to the SRs, but they also benefitted from the tactical and ideological 
input from a number of individuals and groups. As with earlier terrorist factions, the SRs 
drew substantially from their revolutionary predecessors, but contributed their own 
elements of thought and methodology. In terms of actually perpetrating terrorism, the 
SRs were the descendant of Narodnaya Volia, but their scientific Marxism made the SRs 
a new entity.231  One of the most salient characteristics of the Socialist Revolutionary 
wave of terrorism was the quantum leap in the scope of violence. Historians like Anna 
Geifman and Norman Naimark indicate that one of the key elements that made the 
movement so destructive was the individualization and decentralization of terrorist 
activity. There were no universally recognized or enduring leaders for either the Social 
Democrats or the Socialist Revolutionaries. Moreover, the groups’ titles served primarily 
as a means of classifying and differentiating the groups and they did not necessarily 
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imply ideological or tactical uniformity.232  Even though major figures like Evno Azef 
held high positions in extremist organizations, they never truly held a monopoly on either 
the indoctrination or tactical control of terrorists during the SR phase. However, despite 
the diffuse and individual nature of radicalism in the last years of the 19th century and 
early years of the 20th, a number of groups and individuals did make an impact on the 
movement.           
1. Georgii Plekhanov 
One of the most significant and lasting voices in the sphere of Russian 
revolutionaries, especially among those of the Marxist inclination, was that of Georgii 
Plekhanov. Plekhanov enjoyed a very long career as a revolutionary that included 
influential roles in Land and Freedom, Black Repartition, and the Social Democratic 
movement.233  The most important purpose that Plekhanov served, however, was being 
one of the first major importers of Marxism to Russia.234  Despite his influence on 
terrorism, Plekhanov was no terrorist, himself. In fact, Plekhanov stridently opposed 
terrorism from the time of his membership in Land and Freedom for the remainder of his 
revolutionary career and life.235  Plekhanov’s perspectives, although they seem more 
pacifistic than those of his contemporaries, won him more opponents than friends. It is 
not surprising that members of Narodnaya Volia viewed Plekhanov as too passive and 
agrarian-focused, but even Vera Zasulich, a co-member in Black Repartition and later a 
co-author with Plekhanov in Iskra, evaluated him as excessively theoretical.236  
Ironically, Karl Marx was far more enthusiastic about the exploits of Narodnaya Volia 
than the efforts of his self-proclaimed apostle, Plekhanov.237  Even though Plekhanov 
and his retinue opposed terrorism, they were still revolutionaries and, therefore, targets of 
state authorities. To escape the disruptive scrutiny and attacks by the police, Plekhanov 
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and a number of his followers left Russia for Western Europe in 1880.238  Outside of 
Russia’s borders, Plekhanov continued his revolutionary work and devoted a substantial 
amount of time to translating Marx’s Communist Manifesto and building his 
Emancipation of Labor Party.239  Historians dispute the extent to which Plekhanov 
directly influenced the formation of the Social Democrat Party, but it is generally agreed 
that the Social Democrats and Emancipation of Labor interacted as equals during the 
1880s240  One of Plekhanov’s major works was the pamphlet entitled “Our Differences.”  
The publication met widespread acclaim among Social Democrats and even induced a 
significant number of members of Narodnaya Volia to join the Social Democratic 
Party.241  Despite his successes, however, Plekhanov cuts a sad figure; his opposition to 
violence distanced him from the majority of his contemporaries and even from the 
ideologue to whom he was most devoted, Karl Marx. Moreover, under the flag of 
Marxism, which Plekhanov helped bring into Russia, the Socialist Revolutionaries would 
unleash a terrorist campaign of unprecedented scope and brutality. 
2. The Social Democrat Party 
If Plekhanov was one of the major individuals to import Marxism into Russia, 
then the Social Democrat Party was the group that cultivated the seed. Once again, the 
title of Social Democrat does not and should not imply universal ideological uniformity; 
the members of the Social Democratic movement were spread in terms of both location 
and ideology. Even the birth of the Social Democratic movement in Russia cannot be 
traced to a single source. Inside Russia, the first group to call itself Social Democrats 
arose in 1885 and was composed of a small group St. Petersburg students who rejected 
the violent and unscientific tenets of populism, ascribing instead to the teachings of Marx 
and Lassalle. At roughly the same time, Plekhanov and his Emancipation of Labor Party, 
comprised largely of Russian émigrés, began to supply Marxist literature to the Russian 
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underground.242  The Social Democrats and Emancipation of Labor Party grew to have 
healthy correspondence and mutual cooperation.243  To the man, the founding members 
of the Social Democratic party opposed terrorism, but by 1886 members of Social 
Democratic circles had already developed a terrorist conspiracy that called itself the 
Terrorist Fraction of Narodnaya Volia. The group intended to assassinate Alexander III 
and included in its membership Alexander Ulyanov, the elder brother of Vladimir 
Ulyanov (Lenin).244  Before conspirators were able to achieve their goal, the police foiled 
the plot and arrested the would-be assassins. Around the same time, the police were also 
able to infiltrate the Social Democrat Party which precipitated the arrest many of the 
group’s members. However, even before the drastic reduction in its number, the Social 
Democrats had already begun to decentralize their organization; the members met only 
sparingly and there was no recognized central organizing authority.245 
Although the Social Democrats were unable to conduct a fait accompli like 
Narodnaya Volia, their legacy was still critical to the Socialist Revolutionary phase of 
terror. The Social Democrats greatest contributions to the revolutionary movement of the 
period were its organizational decentralization and ecumenism. Nearly all of the 
revolutionary groups since the nihilists displayed a tendency for factionalism, but the 
Social Democrats were unique in that they were able to accommodate a relatively wide 
spectrum of revolutionary perspectives. The ideological tolerance of the Social 
Democrats was largely the result of pragmatism that arose intrinsically within the 
movement. Even the beginnings of social democracy heralded its ecumenical nature, for 
the movement began as a collaborative effort between different groups. Additionally, 
once the authorities infiltrated the organization and broke up the assassination attempt on 
Alexander III, the splintered organization was forced to adapt to operating without a 
centralized system of authority which precluded the group’s ability to maintain strict 
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ideological unity.246 Social Democrats were also pragmatic concerning terrorism. The 
founding figures of the movement refused to participate in terror personally, but they did 
not oppose the practice among other groups.247  The inclusive nature of the Social 
Democrats also carried on into future revolutionary groups. The decentralized and 
practical approach of the Social Democrats is clearly visible in the Socialist 
Revolutionary method of terror after 1905. The SRs condoned and even encouraged 
individual and unsanctioned acts of terror, which contributed significantly to the massive 
scope of violence that took place in the early years of the twentieth century.248  In 
essence, the Social Democrats and later the Socialist Revolutionaries became brand 
names under which individuals could partake in extremism, even if they did not 
completely accord with the full ideological program of the group. 
3. The Socialist Revolutionary Party  
The single most deadly organization from the start of the revolutionary movement 
up to the rise of the Bolsheviks was Socialist Revolutionary Party. The Socialist 
Revolutionary Party came into existence in 1901 when several autonomous revolutionary 
parties merged into a single group.249  From the outset, the SRs unabashedly supported 
terror, and the party’s Combat Organization was able to carry out assassinations of an 
impressive number, success rate, and rank of victims.250  Some of the most notable 
victims of the Combat Organization were Interior Minister Dimitrii Sipiagin in 1902, 
Governor N. M. Bogdanovich in 1903, Interior Minister Viacheslav von Plehve in 1904, 
and Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich in 1905.251  The SRs also killed 49 city 
governors, vice-governors, governors, and governors general throughout Russia.252   The 
Combat Organization disbanded after Nicholas II’s October Manifesto, but reconstituted 
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itself by the start of 1906 to counter the still potent regime.253  However, by the time the 
faction disbanded, it had unwittingly achieved the primary extent of its historical legacy; 
it had motivated revolutionaries of all parties to partake in a proverbial explosion of 
terrorism and revolutionary crime that rocked all corners of the Russian empire. 
In addition to its name, the SR Party contributed a great deal to the terrorist 
movement of the period. Up until 1905, the SRs were the only leftist party that formally 
incorporated terrorism into its platform, and they paved the way for the colossal outbreak 
of terror that occurred between 1905 and 1907.254   The Socialist Revolutionary Party 
was unique among other revolutionary organizations in its ability to be all things to all 
people. In addition to having a centralized assassination group, the Combat Organization, 
the SRs exercised terror by personal initiative.255  Especially after 1905, any member of 
the SR Party could perpetrate an act of terrorism on a vast array of targets and face 
relatively little scrutiny from his or her comrades even if the attack caused collateral 
damage or targeted a person only peripherally connected to the regime.256  In addition to 
promoting terrorist violence on an unprecedented scale, the SR phase also witnessed the 
large-scale birth of crime for revolutionary causes. Revolutionary crimes, called 
expropriations, were primarily financial in nature and included extortion, kidnapping, 
robbery, and similar acts. The profusion of expropriations generated a colossal amount of 
funding for revolutionary organizations, but ultimately obscured the line between 
revolutionaries and bandits. To say that all of the violence and disorder between 1905 and 
1907 was directly related to the Socialist Revolutionary cause would not be accurate; 
many of the perpetrators of the period were affiliated with different extremist parties, and 
many others were simply criminals that capitalized on the situation for personal gain.257  
A sad fact of the era was that violence and expropriations were conducted at such a great 
scale that some of the revolutionary groups occasionally got into disagreements over 
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which group should take credit for a terrorist action or which group completed more.258  
While the SRs were not complicit in all of the violence of the time, they deserve credit as 
the motivators of the outbreak. Moreover, the violence of 1905 to 1907 seriously reduced 
the legitimacy of the regime and produced a high degree of fear among government 
functionaries which accorded strongly with SR goals.259  One of the key weaknesses of 
the movement, however, was that the indiscriminate nature of the violence also harmed 
and intimidated large portions of the general population. The predictable result of the 
civilian bloodletting was the erosion of support for radicalism. Ultimately, the loss of 
public support combined with a new round of government repression and revulsion over 
Azef’s duplicitous activities brought the last prerevolutionary phase of terror to an 
ignominious close.260      
4. Evno Azef 
Evno Azef is perhaps one of the most intriguing and complex individuals of the 
entire revolutionary movement. At different junctures, Azef occupied leading roles in 
both the Combat Organization of the SR Party, and its fastidious rival, the tsarist 
Okhrana.261  In many ways, Azef is a fitting personification of the period, as a whole. He 
combined duplicity, insecurity, and self-interest into a single individual who contributed 
significantly to the perpetration of the SR phase of terrorism but also its termination. 
Azef was born into a Jewish family in Lyskovo in 1869, and was an archetypical example 
of the socioeconomic dilemma in which Russian Jews found themselves at the time. 
Azef’s family, like most other Jewish families, was endemically poor and lived under the 
near constant shadow of the pogroms that periodically wracked the Jewish community. 
Unlike many of his contemporaries, Azef was able to escape from the Jewish Pale. Azef 
attended the Petrovskii Technical High School in Rostov and graduated at the age of 21in 
1890.262  Although very intelligent, Azef struggled through school, particularly in the 
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social realm. The young Azef was apprehensive about his contemporaries, ridiculed for 
his portly build, and disdained for his penchant to inform instructors of other student’s 
misdeeds.263 One of the only places in school that Azef could find acceptance was among 
circles of revolutionaries. Membership in the revolutionary milieu gave him the sense of 
identity and belonging that he craved, yet it ultimately failed to disabuse him of his 
chronic personal insecurity.264  Azef, fearing incarceration when Rostov police began to 
arrest the members of his group, fled abroad with 800 rubles. In Germany, the money 
dried up quickly, forcing Azef to pursue new employment. After attempting a number of 
odd-jobs, Azef resolved to become an informant for the police. On June 10, 1893, Azef 
entered the payroll of the Okhrana.265  The same characteristics that made him a social 
outcast in school made Azef a great asset for the police. Azef lived in Germany for 
several more years, all the while building his connections with the revolutionary 
subculture and his reputation with the Imperial Police.266 In 1899, Azef’s employers 
ordered him to return to Russia to continue his work. Azef’s aptitude as a spy facilitated 
his presence at the revolutionary conference that produced the Socialist Revolutionary 
Party, during which he began building relationships with many of the movement’s 
leaders.267  By 1906, Azef became a full member of the Central Committee of the Party 
of Socialist Revolutionaries and served as a crucial liaison between the Central 
Committee and Combat Organization, all the while maintaining contact with the 
Okhrana.268 Azef was so talented that none of his colleagues ever suspected his treachery 
before his unmasking in 1908.269 
In that light, Azef appears to be a veritable hero of espionage, albeit a rude and 
amoral one. He provided the authorities with a tremendous amount of information that 
led to the prevention of numerous assassination attempts, to include ones that targeted the 
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Tsar and the Prime Minister.270  However, Azef’s profession did have an uglier side. In 
order to maintain his revolutionary credibility, Azef had to be complicit in many 
successful terrorist activities, and in order to keep his police handlers satisfied, he had to 
repeatedly betray his supposed comrades. Azef’s masquerade could not continue 
indefinitely. Near the end of 1908, one of Azef’s fellow revolutionaries, with the 
assistance of a number of turned Okhrana agents, revealed Azef’s double game to the 
SRs.271  Unlike many other discovered agents, Azef survived the ordeal but was 
immortalized as the “Russian Judas” and a host of other demonic epithets.272  While Azef 
may not have been the devil incarnate, he was certainly no angel. In a legitimate, yet 
ironic, turn of events, the SRs were so disgusted with Azef’s conduct that they officially 
accused him of provocation before the tsarist legal system.273  The ability of the SRs to 
overtly raise a case in government was a relatively new development. The Imperial 
Manifesto of 1905, as part of allowing the gathering of a Duma, allowed the 
revolutionary groups to openly exist and participate in government.274  To a large extent, 
the accusation was also an attempt to defame the Okhrana, but the SRs did genuinely 
believe in Azef’s guilt. If convicted, Azef, and by extension the Okhrana, would have 
been considered responsible for instigating many of the Combat Organization’s high-
profile assassinations, a very serious charge.275  Ultimately, Azef was found not guilty, 
but even if he was convicted, the point would have been moot because Azef had fled the 
country by that time.276   
The circumstances surrounding his unmasking and subsequent escape from the 
vengeance of the SRs demonstrate with great clarity that the only cause that Azef truly 
cared about was his own personal comfort and safety. When Azef discovered that his 
connections to the Okhrana had been revealed, he promptly fled the country to Germany. 
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As he left his home, Azef took care to gather whatever money he could lay hands on, but 
made no efforts to bid farewell to his children, who he would never see again.277  Despite 
appearances, however, Azef was in no way struggling financially. In addition to his 
colossal salary from the Okhrana, Azef had also embezzled a tremendous amount of 
money from the SR Party. Following his escape from Russia, Azef lived a life of 
astounding profligacy; he had amassed the financial means to spend over 75 thousand 
francs per year on all varieties of luxuries.278  Azef’s duplicity decisively destroyed 
whatever was left of the image of a virtuous assassin and sounded the death-knell of the 
final prerevolutionary phase of terrorism.279  Ultimately, tsarist legal officials cleared 
Azef of the more odious charges of provocation, but he is still a personification of the 
moral erosion of the era and a demonstration of the lengths to which the regime would go 
to silence opposition.280      
C. WHAT IT MEANT TO BE A TERRORIST 
In an analysis of the Socialist Revolutionary phase of terror, there lies a danger of 
associating the violence with a unified command structure as was the case with previous 
terror groups. The SR party did have the Combat Organization which functioned 
similarly to the Executive Committee of Narodnaya Volia, but the victims of the Combat 
Organization, while high in rank, accounted for a relatively small percentage of the 
victims of the broader movement. The vast majority of the casualties were instead caused 
by individuals who, at best, were only nominally connected to a revolutionary faction 
and, at worst, were thinly disguised bandits. Thus, while the ideologues of the movement 
were important, the individual-level characteristics and motivations of SR-phase terrorists 
are even more instructive. 
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1. Profile of a Terrorist in the SR Phase 
In many cases, the profile of the typical terrorist changed in the SR phase. While 
populists were often intellectuals that were raised as denizens of the upper classes, the 
SRs were less gentrified and connected far more loosely to high-minded ideals. In fact, 
most intellectual revolutionaries of the period were not members of the SR party and 
instead associated with other groups like the Social Democrats or Kadets. Although the 
more liberal groups usually refused to directly participate in acts of terror, they still 
generally accepted terrorism as a tactic among other groups either by direct admission, as 
was the case with the Social Democrats, or through their silence on the matter, as was the 
case with the Kadets.281  During the 1905 to 1907 outbreak of mass violence, there was 
often little that separated a terrorist from a bandit or common criminal. Moreover, 
members of nearly all oppositionist factions partook in the chaos including small, 
unaffiliated, and local groups.282  Thus, during the late stages of the SR phase of terror, 
the violence got so out of control that the notion of a typical terrorist essentially 
disintegrated.  
2. Motivations 
The growing profusion of violence that occurred throughout the SR phase not 
only destroyed the profile of a terrorist but it also led to the demise of specific and 
coherent motivations to engage in acts of terror. The de-rationalization of terror during 
the period of 1901 through 1908 is most clearly demonstrated by changes in the primary 
targets of terror and by the backslide of expropriations into little more than petty theft. 
The trajectory of terrorist targeting in the SR phase rapidly transitioned from very precise 
attacks on high ranking government functionaries to indiscriminate attacks on the civilian 
population. The Combat Organization of the Socialist Revolutionary party begun 
operations in 1902 and was the primary initiator of violence of the period.283  As the 
period progressed, terrorists began to target government functionaries of increasingly low 
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rank and importance; after 1905, the targeting of civilians became commonplace.284 The 
evolution in the tools of terror is also instructive. The Combat Organization primarily 
used precise weapons like knives and pistols in its assassinations, but as terror became 
more decentralized, the use of indiscriminant weapons like bombs became the norm, 
causing a predictable rise in harm to bystanders. Another major indicator of the collapse 
of purely ideological motivations during the SR phase was the evolution of 
expropriations from a fund-raising scheme for a revolutionary party to little more than 
theft for personal gain. Terrorism is an expensive endeavor, and drastic fund-raising 
measures became increasingly necessary as members of terrorist organizations grew less 
wealthy. In some cases, revolutionary groups sought to collect form their own members, 
but the results were usually scant.285  Eventually, revolutionary groups began to adopt the 
practice of extracting funds from their communities through extortion, intimidation, or 
outright theft. From 1905 through 1907, many nominal terrorists committed 
expropriations simply for personal gain. During that period, revolutionaries and bandits 
expropriated an estimated 7,000,000 rubles throughout Russia, and it is certain that much 
of that went to non-revolutionary causes. 286 
3. Mystique 
Although many terrorists gave their lives for the revolutionary cause from 1901 to 
1905, the greatest casualty for the revolutionaries of the period was the myth of the 
virtuous assassin. Even by the accession of Nicholas II to the throne, much of the 
idealism of the revolutionary movement had eroded amongst populists and Social 
Democrats, alike.287  Many of the notions of a brighter socialist future had lost their 
luster. By the time the SRs began their efforts, the revolutionary movement became more 
of a war of attrition than an ideological outcry. Moreover, as general violence broke out 
in 1905, any claims of honor in terrorism were nearly laughable. Although the notion of 
virtue in terror had dissipated among the broader movement, some dedicated 
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revolutionaries still clung to the belief. The revulsion with which many revolutionaries 
viewed the Azef affair indicates that significant numbers of radicals still saw good in 
their ultimate program and in the people that labored toward it. Revelations of Azef’s 
duplicity decisively crushed what little virtue revolutionary terrorists perceived in their 
profession. Although the new government crackdown engineered by Prime Minister 
Stolypin deserves a substantial portion of the credit for drawing the third and final phase 
of prerevolutionary terror to a close, it is likely that the collapse of the belief in the 
praiseworthiness of terrorism played at least as large a role.288 
D. CONCLUSION 
After nearly twenty years of apparent peace following the assassination of 
Alexander II, the Combat Organization of the Socialist Revolutionary party revived the 
tradition of revolutionary terror in 1901 which touched off a wave of violence that 
endured until 1908. The SRs, however, entered an environment that was rather different 
from the one in which their radical predecessors existed. The SRs faced a new Tsar, a 
revamped police force, and a great deal of national tension caused by both internal and 
external developments. The uneasy national context was conducive to the outbreak of 
violence and what began as few, precisely-targeted assassinations by the Combat 
Organization of the SR party eventually gave way to violence and chaos on a national 
scale. Some of the major ideological and tactical trends to arise during the period were 
the decentralization in of revolutionary groups and the replacement of populism with 
Marxism as the foundational revolutionary ideology. The SR phase affected state policy 
in more tangible ways than in previous waves of terrorism, and even helped to motivate 
Nicholas II to found the first parliamentary assembly in 1905. Contrary to the regime’s 
hopes, the new accession did not pacify the terrorists. In fact, the most brutal and 
widespread violence came after the gathering of the first Duma. The major outbreak of 
violence from 1905 to 1907, while it did have the predictable effect of hampering the 
regime, damaged the image of a virtuous terrorist in a profound way. The orgy of 
violence robbed revolutionaries of the ability to claim any sort of moral high ground in its 
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conflict with the state. In 1909, the revelations of Evno Azef’s duplicitous dealings with 
both the SR party and the Okhrana dealt the deathblow to the notion of honor in the 
revolutionary movement and completed the nationwide retreat from rampant terrorism. 
Ultimately, the legacy of the SR phase of terror is somewhat self-contradicting; terrorists 
in the SR phase initiated violence of a scope theretofore unseen in the Russian empire, 
yet in doing so defeated themselves by exceeding the public’s tolerance of the chaos and 
provoking still another crackdown from the regime. Even within the revolutionary groups 
justification for violence was relatively thin and much of the earlier idealism had 
thoroughly expired. 
Although the course and context of the SR phase of terrorism diverged from those 
of the previous phases, many of the underlying factors remained the same, especially 
concerning the influence of the environment, ideologues, and individual motivations. 
Once again, the national context played a major role in the reemergence of terrorism in 
1901. National trends like continued government repression, industrialization, 
urbanization, agricultural woes, and racial tensions combined with significant popular 
outcry over regime failings like the Russo-Japanese War, Bloody Sunday, and the general 
weakness of Nicholas II’s leadership to produce widespread public dissatisfaction. 
Interestingly, at no time before the SR phase of terrorism was discontent so widespread 
throughout the empire, and no terrorist movement before the SR phase was nearly as 
destructive. The breadth and intensity of the outbreak of terrorism from 1901 to 1908, 
while strongly affected by the national environment, would not have been as pronounced 
without the influence of the ideologues of the period. In particular, the introduction of 
Marxism and the growing trends of ecumenism and decentralization among revolutionary 
groups played large part in setting the course of the movement. The individual 
motivations of terrorists also experienced a profound change during the SR period. By the 
period’s end, it was clear that the previously championed ideals of a revolutionary 
brotherhood and a virtuous cause had given way to greed and chaos. Although a severe 
government crackdown deserves a notable amount of credit for bringing the outbreak to a 
close, it is instructive that the SR terrorist movement lost its momentum in conjunction 
with the destruction of the ideals to which radical groups had long clung. 
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V. SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the goal of this thesis is to explore a single, mystifying question—
Why would privileged and well-educated persons embrace political violence or what is 
today called terrorism?  It is distressing and puzzling that so many individuals, most of 
whom were young and of sound mind, accepted tremendous personal risk and privation 
in order to perpetrate acts of terrorism against the leading estates and dynasty in Russian 
society. This thesis can hardly hope to answer the question in full, but its analysis, based 
upon environmental, ideologue-driven, and individual motivators, does reveal a number 
of important trends. 
A. RESUME  
In each of the phases of revolutionary terrorism, whether from 1866 through 
1871, 1878 through 1882, or 1901 through 1908, environmental factors, that is, factors of 
ideas, society, state, culture, as well as personality, played a significant role in the 
development of the radical movements and their subsequent turn to violence. In late 
imperial Russia, the tsarist government, in its struggle with mass politics as well as the 
changing shape of state and society in Europe generally, was one of the primary 
environmental influences. Since the Middle Ages, the Russian autocrat resided at the 
heart of politics. Unfortunately for Russia’s last Tsars, the late nineteenth century was 
characterized by the ever-increasing obviousness of Russia’s backwardness in the face of 
rapid change in society and economy elsewhere in Europe, of which Russia was a part. 
The Russian state generated numerous grievances among the population through the 
institution of serfdom, intellectual repression, and the suppression of women and 
minorities, to name but a few. Moreover, the regime repeatedly demonstrated its own 
weakness through severe mismanagement of internal crises and international debacles 
like the Crimean War (1853–56), Russo-Turkish War (1877–78), and the Russo-Japanese 
War (1904–05). In all three phases of terrorism, when dissent movements arose in 
response to the national grievances, the regime’s reflexive response was to crack down 
which only exacerbated the problem. Tsarist crackdowns eliminated productive and 
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peaceful means of political expression and left violence as the only means by which 
dissenting groups could make themselves heard. In addition, law enforcement operations 
against revolutionaries, while they did help to slow revolutionary activities, created 
martyrs that the movements could use for recruitment or motivation. In all three phases of 
terror, the police did eventually gain control of the situation, but not until after terrorist 
activity reached a level that exceeded the public’s ability to accept. The disturbing trend 
in late Imperial Russia, was that the public grew increasingly tolerant of terrorism as time 
went on. While the murder of a single individual was enough to turn the public against 
the nihilists, the public did not reject the SRs until the massive and generalized outbreak 
of violence from 1905 to 1907. In fairness to the regime, some contemporary trends and 
events that contributed to radicalism were out of its control. The regime could not have 
feasibly rejected the industrialization that accompanied the closing years of the 19th 
century nor could it have stemmed the spread of leftist ideologies among its European 
neighbors. Despite its historical misfortunes, however, the tsarist regime was the primary 
contributor to the environmental conditions that produced terrorism in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.  
Environmental conditions were an extremely important factor in the development 
of Russian terrorist groups, but the influence of the many ideologues of the time also 
proved to be quite important. Even if societal grievances are severe enough to precipitate 
violence, uncoordinated attacks by private individuals do not constitute a movement. A 
movement requires some form of coherent ideology and organization, both of which 
require ideological leadership. In the case of Russian prerevolutionary terror, ideologues 
clarified issues, supplied alternative visions of the future, and generated tactical plans. In 
each different phase of revolutionary terror, ideologues varied in nature and function. The 
nihilist phase was characterized primarily by the development of radical doctrines. In 
many ways, the nihilists served as the ideological and organizational trailblazers of 
revolutionary terror. Nihilist ideologues, through their writings and meetings, built a 
basic foundation to support further revolutionary activity. Individuals like 
Chernyshevsky, Zaichnevsky, and Bakunin, through their writings gathered a group of 
people that were in general agreement on the contemporary problems and possible 
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solutions. Nechaev and his retinue added to the ideological foundation of the movement 
and pioneered organizational schemes; in his case, the blueprint of a conspiracy. While 
the nihilist ideologues were primarily individuals, groups provided the major ideological 
and tactical guidance for the populists. A very significant feature of ideological 
leadership is its cumulative nature; even failures provide enduring lessons for future 
groups. The populists were able to build upon the lessons from the nihilists and dedicate 
more time to its operations, to include terrorism. By the SR period, revolutionaries had an 
even broader tactical and ideological framework upon which to build. As a result, the 
ideologues of the Socialist Revolutionary phase were able to dedicate most of their time 
and energy to shaping the revolutionary activity into the form that they believed was most 
advantageous. Ultimately, the environment provided the fertile soil for extremism to 
grow, and a large contingency of ideologues cultivated the crop of violence. 
The most integral part of any of the Russian revolutionary terrorist groups was 
their rank-and-file membership. The individual members provided the muscle to the 
ideological skeleton. Since all people are unique, the specific motivations to engage in 
terrorism vary from person to person, but certain motivations proved more influential and 
enduring than others. At a basic level, the influence of the national context and 
ideological leadership played a part in driving individuals to violence. The national 
environment produced grievances which the ideologues shaped and leveraged to build 
terrorist organizations. That explanation, however, is largely tautological and is not 
complete. To say that individuals will turn to violence simply because clever leaders take 
advantage of their frustration gives the ideologues too much credit and removes the 
foundational element of individual volition. Ultimately, the young Russians who joined 
terrorist movements had to choose the path and accept the risks and hardships therein. 
The demographic profile of Russian revolutionary terrorists is extremely informative. In 
the vast majority of cases, the perpetrators of terror were young, unmarried, educated, 
urban, and of relatively secure financial means. Based upon those conditions, it is clear 
that the individuals who partook in revolutionary terrorism had greater freedom of action 
and comparatively less at risk than their married, laboring, or poor countrymen. 
Moreover, the importance of the image of the virtuous assassin cannot be understated. 
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The belief in a righteous cause coupled with support and acceptance from a revolutionary 
brotherhood led individuals to greatly exceed what they would have been likely to 
achieve on their own, both in terms of perseverance and atrocity. The end of the SR phase 
stands as a prime example of the significance of the concepts of revolutionary honor and 
brotherhood. Although the terrorists at the end of the period were harassed by police and 
bereft of popular support, the true death blow to the movement was the destruction of the 
image of terrorist virtue caused by the Azef affair. The notion of revolutionary 
brotherhood also evaporated during the period of general violence from 1905 to 1907 
because terrorism left the close conspiratorial circles of previous movements and became 
a public phenomenon. The growth of the image of a virtuous assassin accompanied the 
growth of Russian revolutionary terrorism, and the death of the spirit of virtue and 
camaraderie came hand-in-hand with its demise. Thus, the assertion that societal 
grievance and cunning ideologues alone can produce a terrorist movement ignores the 
critical factor of individual volition among the would-be terrorists. Certainly, some 
national and social situations are more conducive to extremism than others, but 
individuals must ultimately choose to take part. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Terrorism is a broad and complex topic and every terrorist movement has its own 
peculiarities and idiosyncrasies. Even the three phases of terrorism in late Imperial Russia 
differed from one another in significant ways. However, as different as the phases were, 
all were affected by environmental, ideologue-driven, and individual motivations and 
trends. Significantly, the three factors remained consistent and cumulative throughout all 
three movements. Grievances connected with the regime were endemic to the entire 
period, ideologues carefully crafted the groundswell of public dissatisfaction into 
coherent frameworks and groups, and individuals, often with the zeal of warriors for a 
virtuous cause, comprised the groups and carried out the business of terrorism. In the 
modern day, terrorism has again risen to a prominent spot in the policymaking realm, and 
effective policy requires accurate understanding. As with most modern trends and events, 
a current understanding of terrorism is not complete without a thorough examination of 
its historical roots. To that end, it behooves modern terrorism analysts to reach a high 
 77 
level of familiarity with terrorism in prerevolutionary Russia. At the same time, no 
successful policy can neglect the inevitable impact of change, especially regarding highly 
dynamic phenomena like terrorism. Even the terrorist movements in late imperial Russia 
changed substantially throughout the course of the three phases. In order to accommodate 
change, analytical frameworks are often more effective than theory or doctrine. Although 
this thesis is specific to terrorism in late Imperial Russia, the tripartite analysis involving 
environmental, ideologue-driven, and individual factors is also likely to be useful in 
analyzing other historical and modern instances of terrorism. In closing, this thesis seeks 
to explore the factors that helped generate the world’s first experience with modern 
terrorism and suggest an analytical method that may help to understand other terrorist 
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